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Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local
Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and
Policymaking
Elizabeth Weeks* & Paula Sanford**
Abstract: The opioid epidemic has had a significant impact on
individuals and communities, including local governments responsible
for serving and protecting those affected individuals. This is the first
study of its kind to consider whether those local government costs are
quantifiable, a question that has salience both for pending opioid
litigation in federal and state courts and for local planning and budgeting
decisions. This Article first provides a detailed description of the opioid
litigation landscape, including the federal multidistrict litigation (MDL)
in Ohio, the Native American tribes’ actions, and various procedural and
other hurdles that local government plaintiffs face in seeking monetary
recovery in court. The Article also provides a literature review of
existing studies on the financial impacts of the opioid epidemic, noting
the shortcomings of those studies in regards to quantifying costs for local
governments. Finally, it describes our study methodology, which
involved unstructured, qualitative interviews with local government
department heads and other service providers to determine the extent to
which their opioid costs could be readily captured. Our findings reveal
that some costs are easy to track and correlate with opioids, specifically,
and we provide sample calculations for some of those; other costs are not
currently tracked as opioid-specific but could be with additional effort,
an effort we intend to undertake with future stages of this project; and
still other costs are very hard to disaggregate or quantify, although they
are very real and, often, significant.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article examines the financial impact of the opioid crisis on local
governments, relevant to their posture both as litigants seeking damages
from opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies, 1 and as stewards
* J. Alton Hosch Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, University of Georgia
School of Law. The authors wish to thank TJ Streipe, Russell Gabriel, Ted Baggett, Fazal Khan,
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Hien “Grant” Doan, Kate Thorne, Cole McFerren, . . .
** Senior Public Service Associate and Public Service and Outreach Faculty, University of Georgia
Carl Vinson Institute of Government
1. See, e.g., Michael Kilpatrick Morton, Making the Victim Whole Again? State and Local
Governments Seek to Hold Drug Companies Accountable for Holes Left in their Communities and
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of public monies making informed decisions about how best to address the
epidemic going forward. According to the CDC, between 1999 and 2016,
more than half a million people died from drug overdose. 2 On average,
130 Americans die every day from an opioid overdose. 3 In 2017, President
Trump officially declared the opioid problem a public health emergency. 4
Former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions noted the substantial burden
the opioid crisis has had on federal resources, having already cost the
government $115 billion in 2017 and $1 trillion since 2001 and predicting
an additional $500 billion in opioid-related costs over the next three years.5
In the State of Georgia, “[t]he health care costs associated with opioid
misuse . . . were estimated at $447 million in 2007,” and projected to
increase by eighty percent since then. 6 Likewise, “the cost of opioidrelated inpatient care more than doubled [between 2002 and 2012], rising
to $15 billion in 2012.” 7
This Article’s observations and conclusions regarding how local
governments might track and address the opioid epidemic draw on the
authors’ local government and health care finance expertise, further
informed by unstructured, qualitative interviews with local government
officials and administrators for private organizations in select Georgia
counties. 8 The interviews were not intended to gather statistically
significant, hypothesis-driven data, or even hard numbers for the counties
surveyed, but rather to reality check the authors’ assumptions about the
Budgets, ABA (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/health_law/publications/
aba_health_esource/2017-2018/january2018/makingthevictim/ [https://perma.cc/7YTX-TELR].
2. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html
[https://perma.cc/DED8-V3EC]
(last
updated Dec. 19, 2018).
3. Id.
4. Combatting the National Drug Demand and Opioid Crisis: Memorandum for the Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,305 (Oct. 26, 2017).
5. Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks
Announcing the Prescription Interdiction and Litigation Task Force (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcingprescription-interdiction-and [https://perma.cc/C2EE-A8VB] (citing Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis
in U.S. Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 2001, ALTARUM (Feb. 13, 2018), https://altarum.org/
news/economic-toll-opioid-crisis-us-exceeded-1-trillion-2001 [https://perma.cc/F39A-SLGQ]); see
also Katie Benner & Jan Hoffman, Justice Dept. Backs High-Stakes Lawsuit Against Opioid Makers,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/us/politics/justice-departmentopioid-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/LM48-9SMH].
6. SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH ALLIANCE (SARA), GEORGIA PREVENTION PROJECT,
PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS AND HEROIN EPIDEMIC IN GEORGIA – A WHITE PAPER 7 (2017),
http://www.senate.ga.gov/sro/Documents/
StudyCommRpts/OpioidsAppendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/72FV-EPCZ].
7. Id.
8. See infra Part IV.
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actual and potential financial impact of the opioid crisis on local
governments and the feasibility of quantifying those impacts.
The results reveal that a relatively discrete set of opioid-related costs
are fairly easy to identify and quantify, such as labor and supply costs for
court administration and coroners and costs related to naloxone, an opioid
antagonist. But many other opioid-related expenditures, including law
enforcement, jail, and other judicial-branch services, will be more difficult
for local governments to accurately and comprehensively capture unless
tailored tracking tools, software, coding methodologies, or spreadsheets
are employed. Finally, we note a host of costs on local communities
arising out of the opioid epidemic that will be hard to quantify, such as lost
productivity, quality of life, and lost economic opportunity.
The opioid multidistrict litigation (MDL), which includes numerous
local government plaintiffs, was the impetus for this study, but our
research has multiple aims and audiences. First, it helps inform the
damages calculation in the lawsuits, which very likely will be resolved by
settlement, without reaching the merits of the allegations.9 The three
counties included in the study are litigants and will be called upon to
provide much more detailed discovery responses than our unstructured
interviews. Second, it assesses the usefulness of existing “macro”
(national) studies on the financial impact of opioids for determining costs
on a “micro” (local) level. Existing cost studies extrapolate health care,
lost productivity, and law enforcement costs from mortality and other data,
but those results are very difficult to translate to any meaningful numbers
for a particular city or county. Third, it examines structural and resource
limits and other obstacles that local governments face in capturing the
costs from the opioid epidemic. Fourth, the study supports local
governments’ informed decisionmaking regarding resource allocation and
strategies to address the opioid crisis in the future.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides background on the
opioids lawsuits and need for this cost study. Part III describes existing
studies of the opioid epidemic’s financial impact and notes the limits of
those studies to address the question presented here. Part IV describes the
study methodology and findings. Part V concludes, assessing the study’s
implications and describing the authors’ workplan for assisting local
governments address the identified challenges.

9. See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, Litigation No Substitute for Settlement, Says Opioid MDL
Judge,
NAT’L L.J. (May
10,
2018,
2:18
PM),
https://www.law.com/national
lawjournal/2018/05/10/litigation-no-substitute-for-settlement-says-opioid-mdl-judge/?slreturn=2018
0916131359.
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II. BACKGROUND
This Part describes the litigation that provoked this study of costs that
local governments may be experiencing due to the opioid epidemic in their
communities. As noted above, this study is not aimed exclusively at the
legal damages question but takes a broader and longer-range view,
relevant for city and county budget and planning purposes. Nevertheless,
it is helpful to understand the legal landscape, including prior rounds of
opioid litigation; parties to the present actions; theories of recovery
alleged; defenses asserted; damages sought; procedural developments,
especially the consolidation of the cases at least for pretrial purposed in a
federal MDL; parallel actions, most notably the Native American tribes’
actions; and the progress of these cases toward trial or settlement.
A. Opioid Lawsuits
Amid myriad strategies to address the opioid crisis in the United
States, the massive MDL in the Northern District of Ohio figures
prominently. 10 A number of cities, counties, townships, fire districts,
tribal governments, third-party payors, health care providers, individuals,
and states have filed lawsuits against prescription drug manufacturers,
distributors, pharmacies, pharmacy benefit managers, as well as some nonprofit organizations, individual experts, and family owners of
pharmaceutical companies. 11
1. Allegations and Responses
Defendants include pharmaceutical giants such as Johnson & Johnson
and Purdue Pharma, large distributors such as McKesson and Cardinal
Health, pharmacy chains such as CVS, Rite Aid, and Walgreens, and
physicians who prescribe the drugs. 12 The local government plaintiffs’
complaints are fairly similar, including claims for public nuisance,
violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 13 negligence per se, and negligence and negligent
10. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio 2017); Jan Hoffman, Can
this Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/RM64-8EHT].
11. Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a
National Health Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 354–57 (2018); Erich Eiselt, Too Much of a Bad
Thing: Municipalities and the Opioid Curse, 59 MUN. LAW. 6, 10–11 (2018).
12. Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 355–56.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
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misrepresentation. 14 The complaints further assert claims of fraud and
fraudulent misrepresentation, false advertising, or violation of legal duties
owed to the plaintiffs under state and federal statutes. 15 The public
nuisance claim—”anything that interferes with rights that are held in
common by the general public including public health and safety”—tracks
one of the key claims by states against tobacco companies in the 1990s.16
The plaintiffs allege that pharmaceutical manufacturers downplayed
the addictiveness of the drugs, 17 and engaged in misleading and
“aggressive marketing tactics, quotas for representatives, and financial
kickbacks for doctors” to promote the painkillers. 18 Specifically, the
plaintiffs allege that the manufacturers “pushed highly addictive,
dangerous opioids, falsely representing to doctors that patients would only
rarely succumb to drug addiction” persuaded doctors to prescribe . . .
opioids, which turned patients into drug addicts for their own corporate
profit.” 19 The allegations against pharmacies and distributors are for
breach of their legal duties under federal and state law to monitor, detect,
investigate, refuse, and report suspicious orders that may indicate that the
drugs were being abused, essentially acting as an accessory to the crime. 20
Moreover, government plaintiffs at the city, county, and state levels also
attribute opioid use as the cause of negative effects on public health and
safety. 21 These include costs for “providing treatment for overdoses,
counseling and rehabilitation services, . . . costs associated with providing
care for children whose parents suffer from opioid-related disability,”
increases in drug-related crimes like theft and assault, and increase in costs
of law enforcement and other public services.22 Finally, claims against
doctors revolve around unnecessary prescriptions, when the pain could
have been managed in other ways, or unnecessary refills. 23
14. See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Augusta Cnty. v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corp.,
No. 1:18-cv-00029 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Augusta Complaint]; Complaint
and Demand for Jury Trial, Jackson Cnty. v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corp., No. 1:18-op-45581
(N.D. Ohio May 15, 2018), ECF No. 1; Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Crisp Cnty. v.
Amerisourcebergen Drug Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00036 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 14, 2018), ECF No. 1.
15. See complaints cited supra note 14.
16. Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 355.
17. Benner & Hoffman, supra note 5.
18. Why Does Class-Action Defense Spending Continue to Rise?, ESQUIRE (May 10, 2018),
https://www.esquiresolutions.com/why-does-class-action-defense-spending-continue-to-rise/
[https://perma.cc/YH3F-ZQTH] .
19. Augusta Complaint, supra note 14, at 2.
20. E.g., id. at 65–66.
21. Augusta Complaint, supra note 14, at 3.
22. Id.
23. See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 354.
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Plaintiff lawyers also have filed lawsuits on behalf of infants with an
addiction-related syndrome. 24 Those attorneys have sought to separate
their claims from the MDL, arguing that their claims involve distinct
issues and call for faster resolution, so that the affected babies can receive
financial support for the services that they will require. 25
Responding to the claims, drug companies have acknowledged the
public health crisis but denied liability and sought dismissal of the
lawsuits. 26 For instance, the defendants argued that the “[r]acketeering
claims should be dismissed because injury to business or property was not
alleged,” and public nuisance claims did not allege a “public right with
which distributors interfered.” 27 The manufacturers also argued that they
have “extensively disclosed the risks . . . and that the [FDA] approved the
drugs’ marketing,” 28 which may raise the potential issue of federal
preemption. 29 Distributors asserted that they “neither market[ed] nor
prescribe[d] opioids,” and the alleged misconduct of failing to monitor and
report suspicious orders was “too indirect” to support a claim. 30
Moreover, distributors also contended that emphasis should not be placed
on the aggregate number of prescriptions distributed by all distributors,
since each of them “are not aware of the amounts of drugs shipped by their
competitors . . . and therefore aggregate data cannot constitute a ‘red
flag.’” 31 Physicians can be expected to defend the allegations by asserting
that their prescribing was within the standard of care and that they gave
appropriate warnings to patients.
2. Multidistrict Litigation
As of December 2017, over two hundred prescription opioid cases had
been filed in federal courts across the country. 32 As of February 2018,
24. John O’Brien, Blame the Criminals, Pharmacies Facing Opioid Lawsuits Say, FORBES (June
7, 2018, 1:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/06/07/lets-blame-the-criminalspharmacies-facing-opioid-litigation-say/#265045ba64b8 [https://perma.cc/5EZR-TA9U].
25. Associated Press, Babies Born in Withdrawal New Complication in Opioid Cases, VOA
(Nov. 29, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/babies-born-in-withdrawal-newcomplication-in-opioid-cases/4680172.html [https://perma.cc/8WDP-HW8F].
26. See O’Brien, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Andrew Harris et al., Justice for Opioid Communities Means Massive Payday for Their
Lawyers, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-opioidlawsuits/?srnd=prognosis.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 357.
32. Id. at 359.
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cities, counties, and Native American tribes nationwide filed more than
four hundred complaints. 33 As of June 2018, the number rose to more than
seven hundred. 34 In December 2017, over two hundred prescription opioid
cases filed in federal courts across the country were consolidated in the
federal MDL. 35 MDL is a device under federal law that allows “civil
actions involving one or more common questions of fact . . . pending in
different districts” 36 to be consolidated for more efficient pretrial handling,
including discovery. 37 The federal judicial panel on MDL decides whether
the cases should be consolidated and, if so, to which court the cases should
be transferred. MDL is distinct from federal class action in that “[a] case
proceeds as a class action only if its proponents show that the claims meet
the requirements of commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation,
and—for money damages class actions under [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 23(b)(3)—predominance of common issues over individual
issues.” 38 MDL does not join parties for common or representative
litigation but may have the effect of facilitating collective resolution of the
claims. 39 There is debate over the relative merits of MDL versus class
action from efficiency and fairness perspectives, 40 and even greater
concern about forcing the parties into a mandatory class action, a step that
some have speculated that Judge Polster would pursue.41
The state and local government plaintiffs, for their part, urged the
federal opioids MDL, asserting that their contention against opioid
manufacturers and distributors regarding breach of their duty to monitor,
detect, investigate, refuse, and report suspicious orders of prescription
33. Benner & Hoffman, supra note 5.
34. Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 351–52, 355.
35. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2017);
see also Hoffman, supra note 10.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
37. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 39–40 (1998)
(pointing to legislative history indicating that the statute applies only to pretrial stages); see Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 72 n.13 (2017). As a
reality, however, cases rarely are returned to their original jurisdictions.
38. Howard M. Erichson, What MDL and Class Actions Have in Common, 70 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 29, 37 & n.34 (2017) (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(4), 23(b)(3); then citing WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); and then citing Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591 (1997)).
39. Id. at 38.
40. Compare Burch, supra note 37, with Erichson, supra note 38, at 30 (summarizing Burch’s
arguments).
41. E.g., Daniel Fisher, Opioid Lawyers Say Settlement May Hinge on Forcing Plaintiffs into
Class Action, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/
2018/09/27/opioid-lawyers-say-settlement-may-hinge-on-forcing-plaintiffs-into-class-action/#2bde0
4451d1c [https://perma.cc/23FW-GGLN].
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opiates presents a common question of fact, thus meeting one of the
requirements for creating an MDL. 42 Judge Polster was selected to preside
because of his depth of experience in MDL cases, Ohio’s extensive impact
from the opioid crisis, and the court’s proximity to a number of
defendants. 43 Ohio, like West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire,
and the District of Columbia, is Ground Zero for the opioid crisis. 44 In
some of these communities manufacturers shipped as many as ten
thousand pills per day to a single pharmacy, 45 many prescribed through
“pill mills” and diverted to other users through illicit sales.
As of March 2018, at least twelve counties in Georgia had filed
lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and distributors. 46 Those cases
were quickly pulled into the MDL. The number of Georgia counties,
cities, and hospital authorities filing opioids lawsuits rose to forty as of
May 2018, 47 and to nearly seventy (out of 159 counties) as of August 17,
2018. 48 The claims in the Georgia lawsuits closely track the allegations
listed above. With respect to damages, the Georgia complaints seek
recovery for:
(1) costs for providing medical care, additional therapeutic, and
prescription drug purchases, and other treatments for patients suffering
from opioid-related addiction or disease, including overdoses and deaths;
(2) costs for providing treatment, counseling, and rehabilitation services;
(3) costs for providing treatment of infants born with opioid-related
medical conditions;
(4) costs associated with law enforcement and public safety relating to
42. Courtney Hessler, Consolidation of 66 Opioid Suits Requested, HERALD DISPATCH (Oct. 5,
2017), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/consolidation-of-opioid-suits-requested/article_9c4df
826-c6a6-58fd-9ba8-ac6058aaf2ad.html [https://perma.cc/7ZH3-KVXL].
43. Id.
44. Drug Overdose Deaths, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Dec. 19,
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/XD77-UU3K]
(stating that in 2017 Ohio had the second highest rates of overdoses deaths per 100,000).
45. See Eiselt, supra note 11; H. Energy & Commerce Comm., Red Flags and Warning Signs
Ignored: Opioid Distribution and Enforcement Concerns in West Virginia, H. Energy & Commerce
Comm. 115th Cong. 225 (Dec. 18, 2018).
46. Nick Bowman, Hall Among 12 Georgia Counties Suing Opioid Manufacturers,
GAINESVILLE TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018, 8:36 AM), https://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/hall-among12-georgia-counties-filing-suit-against-opioid-manufacturers/ [https://perma.cc/783U-TFR9].
47. Toombs County Files Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers and Distributors, SE. GA.
TODAY (May 15, 2018), http://southeastgeorgiatoday.com/index.php/archived-newsbreaks/73351opioid-lawsuit-filed [https://perma.cc/Q4FK-A7GQ].
48. Jeremy Redmon, Atlanta-area Governments Sue Opioid Industry Amid Deadly Epidemic,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/atlanta-area-governments-sue-opioid-industry-amid-deadly-epidemic/7gtOHvSktNOI4hjoSu
9njI/ [https://perma.cc/NC4Y-8FZ5].
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the opioid epidemic; and
(5) costs associated with providing care for children whose parents suffer
from opioid-related disability or incapacitation. 49

As explained further below, only a fraction of these costs are truly
local—as opposed to state, federal, or private—and, even among those
costs that actually fall on city and county governments, the costs are very
difficult to capture as related to opioids, specifically, as opposed to other
multi-drug use or other conflating factors. In addition, there are a host of
other costs for local governments not alleged in the list above. Those, too,
however, may be difficult to quantify.
3. Local Government Litigants
It bears emphasis that the posture of the lawsuits, with local
governmental units as plaintiffs, is somewhat unusual. First, why not
individual patients or their surviving family members, as in other
pharmaceutical products liability cases? 50 Second, why not states, as in
the tobacco litigation in the 1990s? 51 Regarding the first question, some
answers can be gleaned from the first wave of opioid litigation in the early
2000s, against Purdue Pharma regarding OxyContin. 52 Those cases were
brought by individuals, as well as states’ attorneys general, regarding the
highly lucrative, extended release drug, which was marketed as being less
addictive because the timed release that purportedly did not produce the
same “highs” as earlier products. 53 The plaintiffs in that waive of litigation
alleged a “wide array of legal theories, including strict products liability,
fraud, negligence, breach of implied warranty, conspiracy, and violations
of state consumer protection statutes.” 54 Purdue defended those lawsuits
aggressively and, for the most part, successfully. Purdue asserted several
arguments that tripped up the plaintiffs, including blaming the plaintiffs
themselves for abusing the products and thus coming to the court with

49. See Augusta Complaint, supra note 14, at 3.
50. See, e.g., Young K. Lee, Beyond Gatekeeping: Class Certification, Judicial Oversight, and
the Promotion of Scientific Research in “Immature” Pharmaceutical Torts, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1905, 1911–15 (cataloguing various pharmaceutical torts cases, including class actions).
51. Master Settlement Agreement, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., http://publichealthlawcenter.org/
topics/tobacco-control/tobacco-control-litigation/master-settlement-agreement
[https://perma.cc/
T45E-3XNZ] (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
52. See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 353.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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unclean hands; 55 contributory negligence, again regarding the plaintiffs’
own behaviors and fault; 56 and intervening causes, including both the
patients’ and prescribing physicians’ conduct, under the learned
intermediary doctrine, 57 which provides that the manufacturer’s duty to
warn is satisfied if conveyed to the prescribing physician, even if not to
the patient. 58 Suits by local government units avoid some of those
individual facts, which raise causation and fault-based obstacles to
recovery.
Although Purdue Pharma successfully defended against civil liability
in the OxyContin lawsuits, it did face criminal liability in 2002. The U.S.
Attorney for the Western District of Virginia launched a criminal
investigation against Purdue alleging misbranding of OxyContin as
difficult to abuse, less addictive, and providing “fewer peaks and valleys”
than other opioids. 59 Ultimately, Purdue pleaded guilty to those charges, 60
and three Purdue executives were barred “for 20 years from doing business
with Medicare or other taxpayer-financed health care program.” 61 Purdue
paid “more than $600 million to federal and state agencies.” 62
With respect to the second question, cities and counties may have
stepped up as plaintiffs precisely to avoid the outcome of the tobacco
litigation. That case concluded in 1998 with a Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) among “46 states, five U.S. territories, and the District
of Columbia against the five largest cigarette manufacturers in America
concerning the advertising, marketing and promotion of cigarettes.” 63 The
MSA represented the largest civil settlement to date, awarding $206 billion
to the states over twenty-five years. 64 As Professor Micah Berman
55. Id.
56. Id. at 358.
57. Id. at 353.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(d)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
59. Press Release, FDA, FDA Announces Results of Investigation into Illegal Promotion of
OxyContin by the Purdue Frederick Company, Inc. (May 10, 2007, revised May 14, 2007) available
at https://web.archive.org/web/20080221180830/http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/NEW
01632.html.
60. Edgar Aliferov, Note, The Role of Direct-Injury Government-Entity Lawsuits in the Opioid
Litigation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1141, 1151 (2018).
61. Barry Meier, Ruling Is Upheld Against Executives Tied to Oxycontin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/business/16purdue.html [https://perma.cc/6MG5DT5L].
62. Paul D. Frederickson, Criminal Marketing: Corporate and Managerial Liability in the
Prescription Drug Industry, 22 MIDWEST L.J. 115, 115 (2008).
63. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 51.
64. Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by
Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1227, 1270 (2008); see Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous
Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33
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explains more thoroughly in his article on this issue, nothing in the MSA
expressly required states to spend those settlement dollars on public health,
and states have, and continue to, put those funds toward a variety of
purposes, plowing much of it into state general revenues and chipping
away at tobacco-related trust funds to balance state budgets. 65 Seeking to
avoid a similar outcome of settlement dollars failing to reach the
communities actually impacted by the opioid crisis, local governments
may be eager to step up as plaintiffs this time around, thus ensuring that
any funds come directly to their affected communities. 66
4. Comparing Forums
While those points may explain why local governments figure
prominently as litigants in the opioid lawsuits, they do not explain why
those plaintiffs appear to welcome the MDL. The defendants are facing
parallel litigation in state courts from a variety of plaintiffs. The
defendants and at least some of the plaintiffs, however, seem to prefer the
MDL. Some state lawsuits are brought by consumers as state class actions,
claiming “higher [insurance] premiums, deductibles, and co-payments
[]because of effects attributable to the opioid epidemic.”67 In addition,
attorneys general in six states—Texas, Florida, Nevada, North Carolina,
North Dakota, and Tennessee—filed lawsuits against Purdue Pharma in
state courts for violation of their respective states’ Deceptive Trade
Practice Acts. 68 After holding back for several months and through the
November 2018 midterm elections, Georgia’s Attorney General filed the
state’s opioid lawsuit in Gwinnett County Superior Court in January

CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2001).
65. See generally Micah Berman, Using Opioid Settlement Proceeds for Public Health: Lessons
from the Tobacco Experience, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1029 (2019) (comparing issues with the tobacco
MSA with a potential opioid litigation settlement); see also TOBACCO FREE KIDS, BROKEN PROMISES
TO OUR CHILDREN: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT THE 1998 TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 20 YEARS LATER
1 (2018), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/statereport [https://perma.cc/665TWVM4] (“In the current budget year, Fiscal Year 2019, the states will collect $27.3 billion from the
settlement and taxes. But they will spend only 2.4 percent of it – $655 million – on programs to
prevent kids from smoking and help smokers quit.”).
66. See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 355.
67. Mark A. York, New York And Other State Court Opioid Litigation Moves Forward Along
With Federal Opiate Rx MDL 2804, MASS TORT NEXUS (June 11, 2018),
http://www.masstortnexus.com/mass-torts-news/new-york-and-other-state-court-opioid-litigationmoves-forward-along-with-federal-opiate-rx-mdl-2804/ [https://perma.cc/HB7P-AZH9].
68. John C. Moritz, 6 States Sue Maker of OxyContin as They Battle Expenses, Human Costs of
Opioid Crisis, USA TODAY (May 16, 2018, 8:37 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2018/05/15/six-attorney-generals-opioid-lawsuits/612721002/ [https://perma.cc/EL7V-SN2C].
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One state, West Virginia, sued a different defendant from the opioid
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies. On November 2, 2017, the
state filed a federal court lawsuit against the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Health Care Organization (“The Joint Commission”),
blaming the Commission’s standards for contributing to the epidemic. 70
The Joint Commission is a non-profit organization that certifies 21,000
health care organizations nationwide and sets standards for those
organizations to adhere. 71 West Virginia alleged that The Joint
Commission colluded with Purdue Pharma in producing its Pain
Management Standards, 72 which are viewed as largely responsible for
“bringing questions about pain into every routine patient encounter,” and,
moreover, that Purdue and other companies funded the report. 73
Although some states have filed in federal courts, 74 by and large state
attorneys general seem to be electing state courts, keeping the cases local
and close to their constituents where any positive resolution will have
maximum political impact. Moreover, U.S. Supreme Court precedent
clarifies that states suing in their parens patriae powers cannot be removed
to federal court on personal jurisdiction grounds. 75 Recognizing that, the
opioid defendants have asserted that the claims necessarily involve federal
questions under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) statutes, thus requiring removal. 76
In general, large defendants tend to prefer consolidation and often
remove state cases to federal courts so that “there is a single legal
69. Press Release, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. CHRIS CARR, Carr Announces Lawsuit Against
Opioid Manufacturers and Distributors (Jan. 3, 2019), https://law.georgia.gov/press-releases/201901-03/carr-announces-lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers-and-distributors
[https://perma.cc/ADG8-832W].
70. See Complaint, City of Charleston v. Joint Comm’n on Accreditation of Health Care Orgs.,
No. 17-4267 (S.D.W.Va. 2017), ECF No. 1.
71. About the Joint Commission, THE JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.org/
about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx [https://perma.cc/E9FQ-4KVG] (last visited Apr.
17 2019).
72. David W. Baker, The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Origins and Evolution, THE
JOINT COMMISSION
(2017), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/Pain_Std_History_
Web_Version_05122017.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSB9-2Q7Q].
73. See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 356–57.
74. Id. at 351–53.
75. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 176 (2014) (holding that a
suit by the State of Mississippi, as the sole plaintiff, was not a removable “mass action” for purposes
of the Class Action Fairness Act).
76. See Complaint at 164, Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clark County v. Amerisourcebergen Drug
Corp., No. 3:18-cv-00015 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2018) (alleging negligence per se based on duties flowing
from the Controlled Substances Act); see also Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 359 (discussing cases
where defendants requested removal based on underlying federal issues).
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battlefield, and they are not subject to the vagaries of state-court juries
across the country.” 77 For perhaps the same reasons, states and other
plaintiffs have resisted being pulled into federal MDL for “fear of losing
leverage amid such a large number of cases.”78 They may expect “better
results with focused lawsuits in state court” against one or two defendants,
where “many states already have won large settlements from other drug
manufacturers with deceptive marketing claims.” 79 Thus, a local venue
may be preferable. As of August 2018, Alabama was the only state to join
the MDL. 80
That said, states, as well as the federal government, seem to recognize
the momentum building behind Judge Polster’s push for settlement at the
MDL. In February 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement
of interest 81 in the federal lawsuits, emphasizing the government’s
“substantial costs and significant interest in addressing the opioid
epidemic.” 82 In August 2018, thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia filed amicus briefs in the Ohio MDL, emphasizing the states’
“unique role” in protecting its citizens’ interests. 83 In both instances, the
federal and state governments want to make sure they have a seat at the
table should discussions on how to slice the settlement pie get underway.
Local governments, by contrast, seem much more willing, and even
anxious, to join the MDL. One reason may be choice of law, in particular,
avoiding unfavorable state law. One notable doctrine is the municipal cost
recovery rule, 84 or, as it is called in Georgia, the free public services
77. Ty E. Howard & Scarlett Singleton Nokes, ‘Opioids and Legal Enforcement—A Primer’,
BRADLEY (July 17, 2018), https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2018/07/opioids-and-legalenforcement-a-primer.
78. Id.
79. Daniel Fisher, Latest Wave of State Opioid Lawsuits Shows Diverging Strategies and
Lawyer Pay Scales, FORBES (May 29, 2018, 05:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/legalnewsline/2018/05/29/latest-wave-of-state-opioid-lawsuits-shows-diverging-strategies-andlawyer-pay-scales/#43133e166d1d [https://perma.cc/8ZCD-M9YL].
80. Amanda Bronstad, 35 AGs File Amicus Briefs Citing a State’s ‘Unique Role’ in Fixing the
Opioid Crisis, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 15, 2018, 7:17 PM), https://www.law.com/national
lawjournal/2018/08/15/35-ags-file-amicus-briefs-citing-a-states-unique-role-in-fixing-the-opioidcrisis/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180817120437/https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/
2018/08/15/35-ags-file-amicus-briefs-citing-a-states-unique-role-in-fixing-the-opioid-crisis/].
81. Statement of Interest, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio 2017),
ECF No. 161.
82. Id. at 1.
83. Brief for the States of Arizona et. al, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the State of Alabama’s
Opposition to the Manufacturer Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint at
1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio 2017), ECF No. 874.
84. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894–95 (E.D. Pa.
2000), aff’d, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that, under the doctrine, city and organizational
plaintiffs could not bring an action against gun manufacturers, claiming that the gun industry’s
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doctrine. 85 The doctrine essentially provides that local governments
cannot recover tort damages for public services that they are supposed to
be providing anyway, such as fire and police protection. 86 State laws vary
on the strength of the doctrine, but the MDL may be a way for city and
county plaintiffs to access a more favorable version of the law or avoid it
altogether.
The doctrine has been used by courts to determine when government
entities can recover damages from tortfeasors. Under the doctrine, “[t]he
general rule is that public expenditures made in the performance of
governmental functions are not recoverable.” 87 For example, courts have
held that governments cannot recover damages for cleaning up negligently
caused oil spills, 88 incarceration of criminals, 89 recapturing an escaped
convict, 90 providing health care and lost wages to a soldier injured by a
private corporation, 91 and industrial fire suppression. 92 The doctrine has
been adopted in several states, including Georgia,93 and it has been
embraced by federal courts. 94
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 1992
case In re Oil Spill by the AMOCO Cadiz coined the term “free public
services doctrine.” 95 But precedents as far back as 1903 historically
rejected government claims for specific types of expenditures.96 Two
1974 Wisconsin cases 97 and one 1976 New Jersey case 98 squarely
recognized the modern doctrine, which has also been applied in federal
court. For example, in District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., the
methods for distributing guns were negligent and a public nuisance).
85. See infra notes 106–115.
86. City of Philadelphia, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 894–95.
87. Koch v. Consol. Edison Co., 468 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (N.Y. 1984) (denying New York City’s
ability to recover costs “incurred for wages, salaries, overtime and other benefits of police, fire,
sanitation and hospital personnel from whom services . . . were required” in response to rioting that
took place during a blackout caused by the power company’s gross negligence).
88. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992).
89. Napa State Hosp. v. Yuba Cty., 71 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1903).
90. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n v. Cobb, 2 S.E.2d 565, 566–67 (N.C. 1939).
91. United States v. Standard Oil of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 316–17 (1947).
92. City of Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
93. Walker Cty. v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
94. E.g., Cty. of Erie v. Colgan Air, Inc., 711 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the
county could not bring an action against airline to recover the costs of emergency and clean-up services
it incurred when responding to airplane crash).
95. 954 F.2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992).
96. Napa State Hosp. v. Yuba Cty., 71 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1903).
97. Allenton Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Soo Line R. Co., 372 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Town of Howard v. Soo Line RR Co., 217 N.W.2d 329, 330 (Wis. 1974).
98. City of Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
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District of Columbia alleged negligence on the part of an airline and
sought to recover the expenses that they incurred in rescuing survivors,
recovering the bodies of the deceased, and raising the airplane and its
contents from the river. 99 The court held that “public funds expended in
the ‘performance of governmental functions such as the emergency service
provided by plaintiff following the crash . . . are not recoverable in
tort.’” 100
Although the doctrine broadly denies government recovery for “public
expenditures made in the performance of governmental functions[,]” 101 it
is not without limitations and exceptions. First, the doctrine does not bar
recovery of public service expenditures expressly authorized by statute. 102
Second, it allows recovery of public service costs where contracts provide
for recovery. 103 Third, federal courts have ruled that recovery is not barred
where government public service expenditures are necessary to abate a
nuisance. 104 Finally, federal courts have found that governmental entities
can recover from tortfeasors for damage to public lands, buildings, or
equipment. 105
Despite those exceptions and limitations in federal common law, the
doctrine remains quite strong in Georgia, and thus may be driving the nearunanimity of Georgia city and county plaintiffs joining the Ohio MDL. In
the leading Georgia case of Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, the
county brought a negligence and public nuisance action against the
crematorium, on whose property human remains were found, and the
funeral homes that sent bodies to the crematorium, to recover the costs that
99. District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
100. Id. at 1079 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Koch v. Consol. Edison Co., 468 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 1984).
102. See Cherry Hill Twp. v. Conti Constr. Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922–23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987) (denying the Township from bringing an action against construction company, which had
accidentally ruptured natural gas main, to recover damages for expenses incurred in providing services
to meet the emergency caused by the rupture), superseded by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:62A-21
(West 2019), as recognized in In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 502 n.9 (N.J. 2007).
103. S. California Edison Co. v. United States, 415 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam)
(granting the government reimbursement for cleanup costs against a polluter based on a land-use
permit conditioned on the payment of such costs).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Ill. Terminal R. Co., 501 F. Supp. 18, 19 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (holding
that “[r]ecent federal court decisions reflect[ed] a growing recognition of suits by government agencies
under federal common law for the abatement of public nuisances.”); see also City of Evansville v.
Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1017–21 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs
could recover their water-treatment costs from defendants under “federal common law” of interstate
water pollution).
105. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 122–23 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that the government should have been able to present evidence that radioactive material
released due to the defendants’ negligence-created property damage rendered city buildings unsafe
and unusable, upon which the government could recover resulting economic losses).
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the county had incurred in recovering, moving, storing, and identifying the
remains. 106 The defendants invoked the free public services doctrine to
bar the county’s claims. 107 The county countered that it still could seek
recovery for negligence and public nuisance. 108
The court rejected the county’s argument, reasoning that because local
governments were established by the legislature “to provide core services
for the public and pay for these services by spreading the costs to all
citizens through taxation,” the local government cannot reallocate how
those costs are spread via tort claims through the judicial system. 109 The
court relied on an earlier case, Torres v. Putnam County, in which Putnam
County sought injunctive relief against business operators who were
unlawfully occupying buildings on their property without obtaining
required inspections, certificates of occupancy, and the like. 110 Putnam
County also sought tort damages for the expense of sending the building
inspector and sheriff to the property. 111 The trial court’s dismissal was
affirmed on the grounds that the county’s injury was experienced in
“enforcing its laws and protecting its citizens” and was thus not
compensable under tort law. 112
Although following and applying the Putnam County precedent, the
Walker County court allowed two exceptions to the doctrine: First, the
government could recover under specific statutory authorization; and
second, the government could recover for damage to government-owned
property. 113 The first exception did not apply because Walker County had
not shown a specific statute that would allow them to recover damages for
abating a public nuisance. 114 The second exception did not apply because
Walker County was not seeking to recover damages associated with an
injury to its property but rather to recover the costs of the public service of
cleaning up the site. Therefore, the court concluded that “whether or not
the carrying out of a public service was mandatory or discretionary” the
106. Walker Cty. v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324, 325–26 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
107. Id. at 326.
108. Id. at 327.
109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. 541 S.E.2d 133, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 136–37.
113. Walker Cty. v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
114. Id. Walker County did cite to Ga. Code Ann. § 31-21-26 (West 2018), which states that
“[n]either the state, county, municipality, nor officers thereof shall be placed at any expense by reason
of delivery or distribution of bodies,” but the court held that this statute “refer[red] to the delivery or
distribution of unclaimed bodies for purposes of medical research,” when read in context with its
surrounding provisions. Walker Cty, 643 S.E.2d at 328. They further held that the two situations were
too different to allow the County to recover under the statute. Id.
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free public services doctrine barred the county’s negligence and public
nuisance claims. 115
Should the cases be remanded to state court or adjudicated under state
law, the free public services doctrine could stand as a serious obstacle to
local governments’ recovery. That said, there is one possible line of
argument, which at least one court found persuasive. 116 On June 18, 2018,
Suffolk County New York Judge Jerry Garguilo declared that the plaintiffs
had presented more than enough evidence for their lawsuit to go forward
and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, with the exception of one
defendant for which personal jurisdiction was lacking. 117 With respect to
the municipal cost recovery rule argument, Judge Garguilo noted that the
claims did not involve damages claims for “the normal provision of police,
fire and emergency services,” 118 but rather sought to “remedy public harm
caused by an intentional, persistent course of deceptive conduct.” 119 To
accept the defendants’ argument that “the municipal cost recovery rule
forecloses the plaintiffs from recovering the costs for services to treat
residents suffering from prescription opioid abuse, addiction or overdose,
or for the increased costs of programs implemented to stem prescription
opioid-related criminal activities,” even when intentional, deceptive
conduct that “mislead the public and prescribers about the risks of
prescription opioids” is alleged, “would distort the doctrine beyond
recognition.” 120 City and county plaintiffs could rely on similar arguments
to seek exception to the doctrine in other states.
5. Advantages of MDL
Although the MDL does not require the same degree of commonality
and typicality as a full-blown federal class action, there may be advantages
for individual local governmental units to proceed together. For one, the
MDL is designed to consolidate and streamline pretrial discovery, which
has been a priority for Judge Polster. He has coordinated plaintiffs’ access
to the federal Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) Automated
Reports and Consolidated Ordering System (ARCOS) database 121 of
115. Walker Cty, 643 S.E.2d at 329.
116. In re Opioid Litig., No. 400000/2017, 2018 WL 3115102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2018).
117. Id. at *28.
118. Id. at *11–12 (quoting City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d
322, 324 (9th Cir. 1983)).
119. Id. at *12.
120. Id.
121. Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/index.html [https://perma.
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controlled substances transactional records relevant to their local
markets, 122 and issued other uniform discovery orders. 123 ARCOS
provides, for both sides, the extent of involvement by any particular
distributors. Another order particularly relevant to the local government
costs question is the June 19, 2018 Fact Sheet Implementation Order,
which calls for detailed responses from all government plaintiffs,
including cities and counties, regarding their claimed injuries, damages,
and persons with relevant knowledge. 124 This discovery order originally
had a ninety-day deadline ending on September 18, 2018, 125 which was
extended for an additional ninety days. 126 The questions in the
Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet overlap with but do not precisely track
the personnel interviewed and types of information sought in our study.
Another advantage of the MDL posture is the potential to drive
settlement pretrial. Quite overtly, that has been a goal of Judge Polster’s
in managing the MDL. 127 On January 9, 2018, at the very first meeting of
counsel in the MDL, he remarked:
People aren’t interested in figuring out the answer to interesting legal
questions like preemption and learned intermediary, or unravelling
complicated conspiracy theories.
So my objective is to do something meaningful to abate this crisis and to
do it in 2018. . . .
....
. . . [W]e don’t need a lot of briefs and we don’t need trials. They’re not
going to—none of them are—none of those are going to solve what
we’ve got. 128

Judge Polster further expressed a commitment to accomplishing what
cc/3GT6-GGCF] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (“ARCOS is an automated, comprehensive drug reporting
system which monitors the flow of DEA controlled substances from their point of manufacture through
commercial distribution channels to point of sale or distribution at the dispensing/retail level . . . .”).
122. See, e.g., Order Regarding ARCOS Data, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 233 (first of three ARCOS orders).
123. See, e.g., Order Regarding Designating Attorneys Addressing Coordination of State/Federal
Discovery, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio June 13, 2018), ECF No.
616.
124. Fact Sheet Implementation Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D.
Ohio June 19, 2018), ECF No. 638.
125. Id. at 1.
126. Report of Special Master entering Discovery Order for Track One Cases & Amending Prior
Orders at 6–7, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2018), ECF No.
941.
127. Transcript of Proceedings at 4–5, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 58 [hereinafter Jan. 9 Proceeding].
128. Id. at 4, 9.
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state and federal elected officials thus far had failed to do in addressing the
opioid crisis, 129 drawing criticism for judicial activism and
overstepping. 130 He stated on record at the same January meeting of
counsel: “The federal court is probably the least likely branch of
government to try and tackle [the opioid epidemic], but candidly, the other
branches of government, federal and state, have punted.” 131 Given that
stance, the question of settlement and, accordingly, damages becomes all
the more important to nail down.
B. Tribal Lawsuits
As discussed more fully in Vice Chancellor Stacy Leeds’s article in
this issue, Native American tribes have been out ahead of states in both
addressing and litigating the opioid epidemic. Those cases are particularly
instructive for this cost study because tribal nation’s health care and other
services are provided within discrete jurisdictional boundaries.132
Moreover, tribes have been especially proactive in treatment and
prevention around opioid addiction. The opioid crisis has had an
especially severe impact in tribal nations. At a hearing before the
Committee on Indian Affairs, chief medical officer of the Indian Health
Service (IHS) reported that American Indians and Alaska Natives had the
highest drug overdose death rates in 2015. Also, between 1999 and 2005,
Native Americans’ deaths by overdose increased by “more than 500
percent.” 133 Native Americans comprise “only 2 percent of the total U.S.
population” yet they “experience[] the highest rate of opioid-related
fatalities . . . .” 134 The root of the problem could be traced in part to the
129.
130.

Hoffman, supra note 10.
See Ryan J. Duplechin, What is the Role of the Judiciary in Tackling the Opioid Epidemic?,
PETRIE-FLOM CTR. (June 15, 2018) http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/15/what-is-therole-of-the-judiciary-in-tackling-the-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/5VGY-SL83]; Daniel Fisher,
Judge Sees Litigation as Only an ‘Aid in Settlement Discussions’ for Opioid Lawsuits, FORBES (May
10, 2018 11:54 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/05/10/judge-sees-litigation-asonly-an-aid-in-settlement-discussions-for-opioid-lawsuits/#6fe6d18c4b99 [https://perma.cc/7G7C4LLB]; see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict
Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2017) (critiquing repeat MDL
attorneys’ ability to influence the MDL rules because “the rules they develop may principally benefit
them at the expense of one-shot plaintiffs”).
131. Jan. 9 Proceeding, supra note 127, at 4.
132. See generally Stacy L. Leeds, Beyond an Emergency Declaration: Tribal Governments and
the Opioid Crisis, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013 (2019) (discussing the Native American tribes’ opioid
litigation).
133. Opioids in Indian Country: Beyond the Crisis to Healing the Community: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 115th Cong. 3 (Mar. 14, 2018) (statement of Michael E. Toedt, MD,
Chief Medical Officer of the Indian Health Services) [hereinafter Hearing].
134. Suzette Brewer, Tribes Lead the Battle to Combat a National Opioid Crisis, HIGH COUNTRY
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“over-prescription of painkillers at [IHS] hospitals and clinics across the
country.” 135
In addition to the death toll, the crisis also exacts heavy economic
consequences on these already impoverished communities. For instance,
many funds intended for basic human services, such as housing or elder
programs, are “being redirected to pay for additional law enforcement,
social services . . . and . . . treatment facilities and programs . . . .” 136 The
tribes also struggle with retaining physicians in remote rural area, which
contributes to this crisis. 137 Moreover, according to the chairman of the
Chippewa Indians of Michigan, the tribes receive “direct services” from
the IHS and “have little choice but to accept policies and procedures
[believed to be] under the direct influence of the pharmaceutical
industry.” 138
Accordingly, the tribal governments sued opioid manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers. In April 2017, the Cherokee Nation filed suit in
tribal court against various defendants such as Wal-Mart, CVS, Cardinal
Health, McKesson, and AmerisourceBergen. 139 The complaint alleged
that the defendants, by “turning a blind eye to known or knowable
problems in their own supply chains,” created “opioid diversion” 140 in the
black market, which “caused and continue to cause a crisis that threatens
the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Cherokee Nation.”141
The tribe sought damages in the form of costs for (1) medical care for
opioid-related patients, (2) counseling and rehabilitation, (3) treatment of
infants born with conditions caused by opioids, (4) welfare for children
whose parents are victims of the crisis, (5) law enforcement and public
safety, and (6) lost productivity. 142 U.S. District Court Judge Terence
Kern enjoined the suit, holding that the Cherokee Nation Tribal Court
lacked jurisdiction over non-native corporations and that the harm alleged
was not sufficiently “catastrophic for tribal self-government” to warrant
NEWS (May 9, 2018), http://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-tribes-lead-the-battle-to-combat-anational-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/2HUB-R8LH].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Petition at 2, Cherokee Nation v. McKesson Corp., No. CV-17-203 (Cherokee Nation Dist.
filed
Apr.
20,
2017),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/petition-4-20-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VU8R-B25W]. Opioid diversion is a phenomenon in which massive number of
opioid pills are diverted from legitimate channels of distribution into the illicit black market.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id. at 3.
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tribal jurisdiction. 143 The tribe then filed the case in Sequoyah County
State Court in Oklahoma. 144
The jurisdictional conflict is between tribes’ sovereign authority, on
the one hand, and federal district courts’ original jurisdiction over actions
arising under federal law, on the other. 145 Very early U.S. Supreme Court
precedents specify that Native American tribes are “distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights” in matters of
local self- government. 146 While no longer “possessed of the full attributes
of sovereignty,” tribes remain a “separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations . . . .” 147 Thus, tribal
jurisdiction turns on whether the defendant is Native American and
whether the events occurred within the geographic boundaries of the tribal
community. 148 More recently, in 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
that tribal remedies, including tribal courts’ adjudication of jurisdictional
matters, 149 must be exhausted before federal district courts may hear
them. 150
As noted, tribal jurisdiction is limited. For one, tribes generally lack
jurisdiction over non-tribal members. 151 An exception exists, however, if
the defendant entered a consensual commercial relationship with the
tribe. 152 Consensual commercial relationships include private contracts
according to the U.S. Supreme Court. 153 The opioid defendants argued,
however, that selling or distributing products via commercial pharmacies
and insurers does not establish that sort of agreement with the tribe, thus,

143. McKesson Corp. v. Hembree, No. 17-CV-323, 2018 WL 340042, at *8 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 9,
2018).
144. See Original Petition, Cherokee Nation v. McKesson Corp. (Okla. Dist. Ct. Sequoyah Cnty.
filed Jan. 19, 2018).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
146. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
147. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886).
148. E.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (denying tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants).
149. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459–60 (1997).
150. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856–57 (1985); Jan
Hoffman, In Opioid Battle, Cherokee Want Their Day in Tribal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/health/cherokee-opioid-addiction-pharmacies.html
[https://perma.cc/Y8MC-8WN3] (quoting Professor Lindsay Robertson, University of Oklahoma
College of Law).
151. See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 852–54.
152. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981); see also Hoffman, supra note 150.
153. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565; see also Gabriel S. Galanda, Getting Commercial in Indian
Country, A.B.A. BUS. L. SEC. (2003), https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2003-07-08/
galanda.html [https://perma.cc/4AXS-HU8V].
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the arrangement does not invoke the exception. 154 Even medications
provided to patients via IHS facilities do not constitute such an agreement
because IHS ultimately is funded by the federal government. 155
Given the jurisdictional scuffle in the Cherokee Nation case, other
tribes that initiated opioid litigation mostly have filed in federal courts.
The St. Croix Chippewa Indians filed in federal court in Wisconsin, and
the Flandreau Santee Sioux and the Rosebud Sioux tribes filed in federal
court in South Dakota. Both suits alleged that defendants “flooded their
territories with opioids and failed to prevent the diversion of these drugs,”
along with violation of state consumer protection law. 156 Another tribe,
the Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians, brought a tort claim in
California state court. 157 Tension remains among tribal advocates
regarding the merits of the federal MDL versus state courts. Again,
perhaps recognizing the momentum of the MDL, in October 2018, three
days before Columbus/Indigenous Peoples Day, four hundred forty-eight
tribes filed an historic amicus brief in the federal MDL, asserting the
especially devastating impact of the opioid epidemic on tribes and
particular sovereign interests implicated. 158 On similar grounds, the
litigant tribes successfully sought a separate track in the MDL,159 along
with Alabama, the original state in the MDL. 160
The tribes’ experience and litigation process may be instructive to this
cost study because, first, the impact of the epidemic has been especially
dramatic on their communities; second, the tribes have been out in front
of the crisis in various regards; and, third, the costs may be easier to
identify within a discrete sovereign nation. On the first point, in addition
154. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Brief in Support at 15–16, McKesson
Corp. v. Hembree, No. 17-cv-323 (N.D. Okla. June 8, 2017), ECF No. 13.
155. See Hoffman, supra note 150.
156. Robin T. Tipps et al., The Opioid Epidemic in Indian Country, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 422,
433 (2018).
157. Id.
158. Brief Amici Curiae of 448 Federally Recognized Tribes in Opposition to Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss Tribal Claims, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
5, 2018), ECF No. 1026; see Amanda Bronstad, 448 Indian Tribes File ‘Historic’ Amicus Brief in
Opioid Lawsuits, LAW.COM (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.law.com/2018/10/11/448-indian-tribes-filehistoric-amicus-brief-in-opioid-lawsuits/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20181012133149/
https://www.law.com/2018/10/11/448-indian-tribes-file-historic-amicus-brief-in-opioid-lawsuits/].
159. Order Re: Reassigning Workload, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804, ECF
No. 549; see Andrew Westney, Hard Hit by Opioids, Tribes to Get Own Track Within MDL, LAW360
(June 5, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1050463/hard-hit-by-opioids-tribes-to-get-owntrack-within-mdl.
160. Melissa D. Berry, Opioid Litigation – Hundreds of Cases Consolidated, THOMAS REUTERS
(Sept.
28,
2018),
http://www.legalexecutiveinstitute.com/opioid-litigation-consolidated/
[https://perma.cc/P9KZ-CT8F].
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to the death toll recounted above, the crisis also exacts heavy economic
consequences on already impoverished Native American communities.
As noted, many funds intended for basic human services, such as housing
or programs for the elderly have been redirected to address the opioid
epidemic. 161 In addition, there is a suggestion that the structure of IHS
funding and administration may make medical services with tribal lands
especially susceptible to pharmaceutical industry control.162 Various
factors may support that potential, including the Joint Commission’s pain
scale and pharmaceutical marketing for increased prescribing, as opposed
to other pain management strategies. The provider shortages may lead to
prescriptions being written for longer durations of time between refills,
and the direct payment design of IHS may reduce oversight.
Structurally, IHS is a division of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and is responsible for providing “federal health
services to American Indians and Alaska Natives.” 163 IHS is the only
division of HHS whose “primary function is direct delivery of health
care.” 164 By contrast, for example, Medicare and Medicaid operate as
federal health insurance programs, paying for, but not directly providing,
medical care or services. Treaties between the United States and tribes
obligate the federal government to appropriate funds to IHS annually. 165
The actual health care services may be provided by IHS, tribal entities, or
Urban Indian Health Program, using the federal funds. Those facilities
generally do not charge or bill any patients regardless of their insurance
status. 166 As an alternative, tribes may enter into Tribal Self-Governance
Programs if they can show under Public Law 93-638 the economic and
personnel resources sufficient to provide health care for their
communities. 167 In any case, direct provision of health care, without the
overlay of managed care strategies that public and private insurers have
utilized to hold down costs, 168 as well as Medicare value-based purchasing
161. See Brewer, supra note 134.
162. Id.
163. About IHS, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/ [https://perma.cc/T4S3ATVU] (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
164. Hearing, supra note 133, at 2.
165. Cristina Boccuti, The Role of Medicare and the Indian Health Service for American Indians
and Alaska Natives: Health, Access and Coverage, KFF (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.kff.org/reportsection/the-role-of-medicare-and-the-indian-health-service-for-american-indians-and-alaska-nativeshealth-access-and-coverage-report/ [https://perma.cc/JN6M-BN5W].
166. Id.
167. Tipps et al., supra note 156, at 427.
168. The bulk of IHS is direct health care services through IHS or tribal service units,
supplemented by Contractor Health Services (CHS), which “provides medical care to eligible
American Indians and Alaska Natives which cannot be provided through the direct health care delivery
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and conditions of participation designed to improve quality of care, may
not operate as robustly within IHS. 169
Although the structure and administration of IHS may exacerbate the
opioid crisis, tribal nations also have taken the lead in various other
respects to address the opioid epidemic. Tribes have been on the forefront
of employing medication-assisted treatment (MAT) and culturally
cognizant counseling services. 170 In addition, Public Law 93-638
qualified tribes, which “receive an annual lump-sum . . . funding that
would otherwise be used by IHS to provide direct care services,” have
supplemented that fund with revenues from tribal economic ventures to
“renovate[] or construct[] their own hospitals and outpatient clinics” and
“redesign health programs according to the needs of the community,” 171
creating another avenue for innovative treatment. Tribes also were
proactive in tracking prescription drugs. In July 2016, a few months after
Congress passed a law 172 that made it “virtually impossible for the DEA
to freeze suspicious narcotic shipments from [pharmaceutical]
companies,” 173 IHS implemented the Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs (PDMP), aiming to “strengthen[] . . . monitoring and deterrence
of prescription misuse and diversion.” 174 IHS was “the first federal
medical agency to require providers to check state [PDMP] databases prior
to prescribing and dispensing opioids for treatment longer than seven
days.” 175 IHS also requires pharmacies to report opioid prescribing data
to state PDMPs, although not expressly required by state or federal laws. 176
In March 2017, IHS chartered the National Committee on Heroin Opioids
and Pain Efforts (HOPE) to effectively coordinate patient care and conduct
system.” INDIAN HEALTH SERV., Contract Health Services Fund Control, Circular No. 91-07, Sec. 2
(June 13, 1991), https://www.ihs.gov/ihm/circulars/1991/contract-health-services-fund-control/
[https://perma.cc/28NL-S4G6]. CHS is subject to various managed care requirements, including
gatekeeping, utilization review, cost sharing, claims processing, and data analysis. Id. at 4.C.
169. See DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE HOSPITALS: MORE MONITORING NEEDED TO ENSURE QUALITY CARE
4 (2016), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-14-00010.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP8N-F9YJ].
170. Eric Wicklund, HHS Grants to Help Native Americans Expand Telehealth Resources,
MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 27, 2018), https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/hhs-grants-to-helpnative-americans-expand-telehealth-resources [https://perma.cc/GFN7-ZNKV].
171. Tipps et al., supra note 156, at 427.
172. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145,
§ 2(a)(1), 130 Stat. 354 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 823 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
173. Scott Higham & Lenny Bernstein, The Drug Industry’s Triumph Over the DEA, WASH.
POST (Oct. 15, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/dea-drugindustry-congress/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dc5f3b99f8de [https://perma.cc/S6UR-N77F].
174. Hearing, supra note 133, at 4.
175. Tipps et al., supra note 156, at 428.
176. Hearing, supra note 133, at 4.
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research in cases of substance abuse. 177
The tribal nations are in a unique position to accurately estimate
damages from the lawsuits. As discussed above, the healthcare system is
effectively centralized within IHS—either IHS directly delivers healthcare
services, or tribes get funding through Public Law contracts. As part of
the process of annual funding, IHS is required to submit to the federal
government a detailed budget request following specific formulation
guidelines. 178 Moreover, the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA) requires all federal agencies, IHS included, to demonstrate that
“they are using their funds effectively toward meeting their missions”;
accordingly, IHS carefully tracks its activities and performance measures
for annual reporting. 179 For instance, in March 2018, IHS received a ten
percent increase in funding and allocated five million dollars to the Opioid
Response Grant Fund and Medication-Assisted Treatment Program. 180
Due to these requirements and the structure of the health care delivery
system in tribal nations, the IHS is uniquely postured to track, identify,
and categorize the costs related to opioid treatment in ways that local
governments are not.
Given the high rates of opioid abuse disorder and related issues in
Native American tribes, the impact on children, including newborns,
within those communities has also been significant. Newborns exposed to
opioids during the mother’s pregnancy often experience Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome (NAS). The Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA), a division of HHS, oversees
surveillance, data collection, and policy recommendations around the
issue of prenatal substance exposure. 181 This data includes a populationlevel survey on substance use and mental health, substance use disorder
treatment, and facility-level data on substance use disorder treatment, with

177. IHS National Committee on Heroin Opioids and Pain Efforts, INDIAN HEALTH SERV.,
https://www.ihs.gov/hope/ [https://perma.cc/4TUH-V8UW] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
178. Annual Budget, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/annualbudget/
[https://perma.cc/BPY7-UYCY] (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
179. GPRA and Other National Reporting, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/crs/
gprareporting/ [https://perma.cc/2GLK-73HV] (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
180. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 676–80;
Stephanie Valenzuela, In Plain Sight: How the Opioid Crisis has Ravaged Indian Country, LAKOTA
PEOPLE’S L. PROJECT (July 5, 2018), http://www.lakotalaw.org/news/2018-07-05/opioid-crisis
[https://perma.cc/9PEW-RURT].
181. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH COORDINATING COUNCIL SUBCOMM. ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG
ABUSE, PROTECTING OUR INFANTS ACT: REPORT TO CONGRESS 14, https://www.samhsa.gov/
sites/default/files/topics/specific_populations/protecting-our-infants-act-report-congress-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UYF9-FSWF] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
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particular attention to Native American tribes in various points. 182 For
opioid-exposed babies, IHS incurs additional costs for hospitalization and
medication during the withdrawal, as well as transportation and care of the
infants. 183 In addition, Native American children affected by opioids may
face particular challenges with respect to child welfare services. The
foster care system may become involved when the children cannot live at
home due to addicted parents or the birth parents choose not to parent.
NAS newborns “are given morphine treatments to ensure they . . . don’t
encounter the dangerous side effects of withdrawing too quickly” and are
weaned off after a few weeks, but “they can be fussy, hard to console and
take care of” in the process, which deters potential foster families. 184
Placement of these children also is complicated under the Indian Child
Welfare Act. A provision of the Act places preference for other family
members, then a family within the tribe or any other Native American
Indian before the child may be adopted by other families. 185 On October
12, 2018, U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor held that provision
unconstitutional for violating equal protection. 186 Expanding the pool of
potential foster or adoptive families may assist in the care of babies born
exposed to opioids, but may have other serious costs, including an
existential threat to tribal nations, since most of them are small
communities and fear permanent placement of their future generations
outside the tribe.
Given the sovereign status of tribes, the unique impacts of the opioid
crisis in those communities, health and welfare delivery structures, and
tribes’ proactive approach to addressing the opioid epidemic, they provide
a unique case study, although full discussion is beyond the scope of this
Article. One relevant takeaway point, however, is that it may be much
easier to isolate tribal opioid costs, as compared to city and county
government opioid costs. Health care costs are well documented through
annual reports to Congress, and tribal versus federal funding can be readily
identified. Other opioid-related expenditures, including under-contract
purchases from non-IHS providers and pharmacies, and budget
182. Id.
183. Kristi Eaton, Opioid Epidemic Threatens the Children – and Future – of Cherokee Nation,
THE LILY (May 3, 2018), http://www.thelily.com/opioid-epidemic-threatens-the-children-and-futureof-cherokee-nation/ [https://perma.cc/Z9L3-FMSM].
184. Id.
185. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)–(b) (2012).
186. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 531–36 (N.D. Tex. 2018); see Joe Bowen, Texas
Judge Rules Indian Child Welfare Act Unconstitutional: Ruling Could Have National Impact, DULUTH
NEWS TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2018, 7:02 PM), http://www.duluthnewstribune.com/news/government-andpolitics/4513139-texas-judge-rules-indian-child-welfare-act-unconstitutional
[https://perma.cc/
4LZJ-4SFQ].
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reallocations are also apparent. Various policy innovations, including
MAT and PDMP, offer best practices that non-tribal governmental units
may consider in addressing the opioid epidemic.
C. Progress at the MDL
As of this writing, the local government and other cases are still
pending at the MDL. Progress has been made over the past year since the
MDL was constituted, but settlement discussion and damages assessments
remain illusory. Early in the process, last winter, on January 11, 2018,
Judge Polster issued an order appointing three special masters to assist
with the litigation: David R. Cohen, Francis McGovern, and Cathy
Yanni. 187 David Cohen is a federal special master who has had years of
experience in mediation, arbitration, and court monitoring. 188 Mr. Cohen
was appointed special master in nearly twenty multidistrict litigation and
other class actions, including mass tort, national health crisis, and Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) class actions. 189 Francis McGovern is a
professor at Duke University School of Law. 190 Professor McGovern has
served as a court-appointed special master in over seventy complex cases
and has “developed solutions in most of the significant mass claim
litigation in the U.S.” and abroad, including the United Nations
Compensation Commission, DDT toxic exposure litigation in Alabama,
and silicone gel breast implant litigation. 191 Cathy Yanni is a panelist with
JAMS, “the largest private provider of [mediation and arbitration] services
worldwide,” and has served as settlement special master in over twenty
large pharmaceutical and medical device cases, in addition to multiple
class actions and MDL cases in the past. 192
On January 31, 2018, Judge Polster held a closed-door session with
tiers of lead lawyers, and their experts and clients. According to three
people in attendance of the meeting, the experts and Attorneys General
recommended that Purdue’s eighty-milligram version of OxyContin,
187. Appointment Order at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan.
11, 2018), ECF No. 69.
188. David R. Cohen Resume, DAVID R. COHEN FEDERAL SPECIAL MASTER,
https://www.specialmaster.law/resume/ [https://perma.cc/N5N6-X4KR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
189. Id.
190. Francis McGovern, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/fac/mcgovern/ [https://perma.cc/
R9W7-Y4HL] (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
191. Id.
192. JAMS Panelist Cathy Yanni Named as a Special Master in Opioid MDL, JAMS (Jan. 17,
2018), https://www.jamsadr.com/news/2018/jams-panelist-cathy-yanni-named-as-a-special-masterin-opiod-mdl
[https://perma.cc/55KQ-QQPB];
see
also
Cathy
Yanni,
JAMS,
https://www.jamsadr.com/yanni/ [https://perma.cc/4UZ2-QRP4] (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
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which is often crushed and snorted by abusers, be removed from the
market. 193 Setting aside the fact that an MDL judge lacks formal
regulatory authority, or even clear authority over the merits of the
litigation, ten days later, on February 9, 2018, Purdue announced that it
would no longer market OxyContin to prescribers. 194 An expert in the
addiction field, Dr. Anna Lembke from Stanford University, attributed this
“radical reversal” by Purdue, which has long contended that it had not
influenced physicians with its drug representations, to “overwhelming
pressure from Judge Polster.” 195 Another plausible explanation is the
“pressure to rehabilitate [the] company[’s] reputation damaged by
litigation and other publicity” by taking an affirmative step to contribute
to the solution. 196
On February 2, 2018, Judge Polster issued an Order directing the
plaintiffs and the DEA to discuss the scope of ARCOS database
production. 197 ARCOS requires manufacturers and distributors to report
their controlled substances transactional records to the DEA. 198 The
information is “collected and compiled by DEA . . . for determining quota,
distribution trends, internal audits, and other analyses.” 199 Every time one
of the controlled substance pills is sold, it is reported to the database,
regarding “where the pill[] went, where [it was] sold and sort of the market
share situation.” 200 Access to the database would provide the plaintiffs
with knowledge of “the extent of involvement by any particular distributor
and where maybe [they] need to focus more . . . efforts.” 201 The DEA
represented that it could provide information regarding large
manufacturers, by state, for a two-year period from 2012 to 2013. 202 In a
hearing on February 26, 2018, the court directed the attorney for
193. Jef Feeley, Purdue’s Oxycontin Targeted at Judge’s Opioid Summit, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2,
2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/purdue-s-oxycontin-said-tobe-targeted-at-judge-s-opioid-summit.
194. Purdue Pharma L.P. Issues Statement on Opioid Promotion, PURDUE PHARMA L.P. (Feb.
9, 2018), http://www.purduepharma.com/news-media/2018/02/purdue-pharma-l-p-issues-statementon-opioid-promotion/ [https://perma.cc/T8K6-G5UX].
195. Hoffman, supra note 10.
196. See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 360.
197. Minutes of 2/26/18 Hearing and Order at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 172804 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2018), ECF No. 155 [hereinafter Feb. 26 Hearing].
198. ARCOS Retail Drug Summary Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN.,
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/retail_drug_summary/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KJ9R-2D75] (last visited Apr. 13, 2019); see 21 U.S.C. § 827(d)(1) (2012 & Supp.
2016).
199. ARCOS Retail Drug Summary Reports, supra note 198.
200. Jan. 9 Proceeding, supra note 127, at 16.
201. Id.
202. Feb. 26 Hearing, supra note 197, at 2.
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DEA/DOJ to file a document by March 5, 2018, setting forth the
authorization and length of time to produce information regarding
manufacturers and distributors by states for a nine-year period from 2006
through 2014. 203
Following two months of settlement talks, Judge Polster allowed
lawyers to proceed with some discovery and motion filings. 204 “On March
6, 2018, the Court met with the parties’ negotiating teams, liaison counsel
and representatives of numerous State Attorneys General to discuss the
status of settlement negotiations.” 205 The parties reported both substantial
progress and “various barriers to a global resolution.” 206 Judge Polster
directed the parties to submit to the special masters, by March 16, 2018,
“their suggestions regarding the appropriate scope and timing of a
litigation track and the contents of a case management order (‘CMO’),
including identification of test cases, sequencing of discovery, timing of
motion practice (including issues related to remand), and any other
relevant matters.” 207 In the same order, the judge also directed special
masters to continue settlement talks with the MDL attorneys, and
scheduled a May 10, 2018 settlement conference.208
On April 11, 2018, the court entered an ARCOS Data Order, directing
the DEA to produce information regarding manufacturers and distributors
for six states for the period of nine years from January 1, 2006, to
December 31, 2014. 209 The six states were Ohio, West Virginia, Illinois,
Alabama, Michigan, and Florida. 210 Commenting on the usefulness of the
data, such as allowing plaintiffs to identity previously unknown companies
to add to the complaints, the court issued the Second ARCOS Order on
May 7, 2018, expanding the scope to the entire United States for the same
period. 211 On June 26, 2018, the Court issued the Third ARCOS Order,
directing the DEA to supplement missing information on certain relevant
chemicals. 212
203. Id.
204. Bronstad, supra note 9.
205. Minutes of 3/6/18 Conference and Order at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 172804 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2018), ECF No. 170.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2.
209. Order Regarding ARCOS Data at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 233.
210. Id.
211. Second Order Regarding ARCOS Data at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 172804 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2018), ECF No. 397.
212. Third Order Regarding ARCOS Data at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 172804 (N.D. Ohio June 26, 2018), ECF No. 668.
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On June 19, 2018, the court issued another discovery order 213
requiring both parties to provide a completed Fact Sheet within ninety
days. 214 This Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet is particularly pertinent to
our study, in that it asks the plaintiffs to provide documentation supporting
their damages allegations, which include several categories: (1) increased
costs for first responders, including EMT and ambulance charges, cost of
payment for improper prescriptions, public hospital charges,
Narcan/Naxolone administration and training costs, opioid treatment and
prevention programs; (2) law enforcement and incarceration costs, which
includes Drug Task Force, operating cost for Drug Accountability courts,
and costs associated with inmates, transportation, and healthcare treatment
in prison; (3) mortality costs, which range from costs in indigent burial,
transportation, and morgue space, to costs in assisting with the foster
children whose family members were victims of the opioid crisis; (4)
rehabilitation costs, covering drug abuse treatment, counseling, and
education programs. 215 That discovery request called for extensive,
detailed disclosures related to the plaintiffs’ claimed damages, dating back
ten years, to January 1, 2008. 216
Judge Polster has also ordered a series of “‘bellwether trials,’ or test
cases that give attorneys an idea of how future cases may play out,” to
begin in 2019. 217 The nature of the litigation, along with the scope of
discovery and expanding list of defendants, “has made it particularly
challenging to contain within traditional legal procedures.” 218 The first
trial was set for March 2019, later delayed six months to November 2019,
and “will include claims made by the city of Cleveland and Cuyahoga and
Summit counties in Northeast Ohio.” 219 Setting trial dates at all, plus the
213. Fact Sheet Implementation Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D.
Ohio June 19, 2018), ECF No. 638.
214. Id. at 1; see complaints cited supra note 14 (listing damages allegations).
215. See complaints cited supra note 14.
216. Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet at 2–5, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig, No. 17-2804
(N.D. Ohio June 19, 2018), ECF No. 638-1 (requesting a range of information, dating back to January
1, 2008, including annual expenditures for law enforcement, courts, corrections, public health, child
welfare, workers compensations, and health insurances; every health care provider and pharmacy that
has been a target of law enforcement or administrative investigation related to opioid prescribing or
dispensing; names of various local government elected and appointed leaders also department heads,
also dating back to January 1, 2008).
217. Eric Heisig, Cleveland Federal Judge Over Opioid Litigation Orders DEA to Release
Painkiller
Sales
Data
For
Entire
U.S.,
http://www.cleveland.com/courtjustice/index.ssf/2018/05/cleveland_federal_judge_over_o.html [https://perma.cc/V3LJ-R9B5] (May
9, 2018).
218. O’Brien, supra note 24.
219. Heisig, supra note 217; Jeff Overley, Opioid MDL Bellwether Trial Postponed 6 Months,
LAW360 (Aug. 13, 2018, 8:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1072924/opioid-mdlbellwether-trial-postponed-6-months.
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delay, is notable given Judge Polster’s initial insistence on speedy and
non-merits-based resolution of the cases. Such was the status of the MDL
at the time we initiated our interviews with local government department
heads and assessment of their ability to quantify these and other opioidrelated costs. Before describing our study, however, we next survey other
studies estimating the financial impact of the opioid crisis, which, for
reasons we explain below, are very difficult to translate into usable cost
estimates at the city or county level.
III. EXISTING OPIOID COST STUDIES
Calculating an accurate number to reflect the financial cost on local
governments caused by the opioid crisis requires creative and careful
thought about the various potential cost impacts as well as appreciation for
the fact that, at least in some locations, some of the more obvious costs
will not be borne by local governments. As noted above, government
healthcare programs are funded at the federal and state, and not local,
level. In Georgia, local public health departments and child welfare
agencies also are state-funded, although that arrangement will differ in
other jurisdictions. School districts are separate governmental units with
their own funding streams and budgets. For these and other reasons
discussed more fully below, existing studies of the economic impact of
opioids are of limited value in assessing local governments’ costs. These
recent studies provide a helpful picture of the burden of the opioid crisis
on a “macro,” or national, level, but translating those findings into
meaningful, calculable amounts for any particular local government is
much more challenging.
A. Literature Review
This Section describes existing studies of opioid-related costs, namely
health care, law enforcement, and lost productivity, as well some statespecific research assessing the scope of the opioid problem and its
incidence within certain industries, but not the particular costs borne by
local governments. We begin with two widely cited nationwide studies,
then turn to two state-level studies for comparison, and, finally, describe
some data collected on Georgia specifically.
1. Florence et al., The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid
Overdose Abuse, and Dependence in the United States
One of the most widely cited opioid cost studies is Curtis S. Florence
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et al.’s 2016 study The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid Overdose
Abuse, and Dependence in the United States, 2013. 220 The Florence study
considered costs recorded in 2013 in three main areas: the healthcare
system, criminal justice, and the workforce. 221 The study considered costs
incurred due to overdose and abuse/dependence by examining health care
and treatment cost, criminal justice cost, and lost productivity. 222
The total economic burden of the opioid crisis was “estimated to be
$78.5 billion.” 223 Over one-third of the total were excess health care costs
caused by the opioid crisis, amounting to $28.9 billion. 224 Increased
criminal justice costs due to the opioid crises were about $7.7 billion. 225
The estimated cost of reduced productivity in the workforce was $20.4
billion. 226 Of those costs, the study found that seventy-three percent of the
cost of the opioid crisis was found in the nonfatal consequences while
Moreover,
twenty-seven percent was attributed to fatalities. 227
“[a]pproximately one quarter of the cost is borne by the public sector in
health care, substance abuse treatment, and criminal justice costs.” 228
While those findings are significant regarding the scope of the problem
and overall public cost impact, they say little about the costs borne by any
single state’s city or county.
Regarding methodology, Florence et al.’s data on the incidence of
overdoses in 2013 came from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) WONDER database, which reports all deaths in the
U.S. National Vital Statistics System, identified by the ICD-10 codes
(T40.2–T40.4), coded as unintentional, intentional, and undetermined. 229
The measure of prescription opioid abuse and dependence came from the
2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), capturing the
U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population ages twelve and older. 230
NSDUH collects information on substance use and identifies “abuse and
dependence based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

220. Curtis S. Florence et al., The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid Overdose, Abuse,
and Dependence in the United States, 2013, 54 MED. CARE 901 (2016).
221. Id. at 902–03.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 901.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 904.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 901.
229. Id. at 902.
230. Id.
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Disorders, 4th edition (DSM–IV).” 231 The NSDUH “also collects detailed
data on health insurance coverage . . . and . . . demographic information”
(e.g., sex and age). 232 The authors used NSDUH data to assign “health
care costs and lost productivity costs to abuse/dependence cases”.233
The study also used a “matched case-control design . . . to estimate the
impact of prescription opioid abuse diagnoses on health care spending,”
using the “Truven Health MarketScan Research Databases for
commercial, Medicaid, and Medicare health plan enrollees.”234 The
Truven Databases contain the pooled healthcare experience of enrollees in
each type of health plan. 235 For commercial and Medicare analyses, the
study used a logistic regression model that “included age, sex
(male/female), baseline health care costs, Charlson comorbidity index,
region of patient residence, . . . and plan type . . . as independent
variables.” 236 The Medicaid analysis utilized “a logistic regression model”
that included “age, sex, race, baseline health care costs, Charlson
comorbidity index, Medicare eligibility, basis of eligibility, and plan
type.” 237 The total cost included “inpatient and outpatient care and all
prescription drugs.” 238 Excess costs “were then multiplied by the relevant
number of opioid abuse patients derived from the NSDUH for each
insurance coverage category reported in the survey data.” 239
The study acknowledged that there are other sources of payment for
substance abuse treatment besides health plans; for example, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMSHA) “block grants and private
foundation funding.” 240 Florence et al. accounted for those additional
sources of payment by “identifying non-insurance-based federal, state,
local, and private expenditures” for substance abuse treatment and then
multiplying those costs “by the share of drug abuse and dependence cases
associated with prescription opioids in the 2013 NSDUH.” 241
With respect to criminal justice costs, the study considered four
components: “(1) police protection, (2) legal and adjudication, (3)
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 902–03 (specific factors omitted).
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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correctional facilities, and (4) property lost due to crimes.” 242 Spending
data on the first three components were obtained from the Justice
Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 2012—Preliminary 243 and “data
on property lost due to crimes” was obtained from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Crime in the United States, 2012.244 The study then
calculated the ratio of these costs that were attributable to opioids in 2013
by looking to “the ratio of arrests for the components of police protection
and legal and adjudication” costs, “the ratio of incarcerations for the
correctional facilities component”, and the “ratio for the component of
property lost due to crimes”. 245
The study considered three components of lost productivity costs: “(1)
premature death from prescription opioid abuse or dependence, (2)
reduced productive hours for abuse/dependence, and (3) incarceration.” 246
The cost of fatal opioid abuse or dependence was assessed by “entering
the number of prescription opioid overdose deaths in 2013 into the Cost of
Injury Reports application under CDC’s WISQARS (Web-based Injury
Statistics Query and Reporting System) cost module.” 247 The module
“estimates the lost productivity of a fatal injury based on the sex and age
of the decedent and the mechanism of injury.” 248 The study then
determined the costs based on “expected earnings for a person of the
decedent’s sex and age over the remaining expected lifespan.”249 For
calculating lost productivity, the study estimated the average time spent in
employment and household production and “estimated the value
(including fringe benefits) of this time by age and sex category.” 250 That
value was then “multiplied by the percentage reduction in productivity
attributable to drug abuse/dependence (17% for males and 18% for
females), and finally summed over values across all sex and age
groups.” 251 The prevalence of abuse/dependence cases “for each sex and
age group [was] tabulated from the 2013 NSDUH” and then multiplied
242. Id.
243. Id. (citing Tracey Kyckelhahn, Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 2012—
Preliminary, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?
ty=pbdetail&iid=5239 [https://perma.cc/L3XB-XAH5]).
244. Id. (citing UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE—FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime in
the United States, 2012 (2013), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/resource-pages/about-cius/aboutcius.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARE8-ETG7]).
245. Id. (internal citations omitted).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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“by the corresponding per person annual production value of US
population” (inflated to 2013 dollars). 252 For calculating lost productivity
due to incarceration, the study took “the number of inmates incarcerated
for crimes attributed to prescription opioid abuse or dependence at federal,
state, and local levels” and multiplied by the per person “annual
production value of the US population inflated to 2013 dollars.” 253
2. U.S. Council of Economic Advisor’s Report, The Underestimated
Cost of the Opioid Crisis
Another important study on opioid costs is the U.S. Council of
Economic Advisor’s (CEA) 2017 report, The Underestimated Cost of the
Opioid Crisis. 254 The CEA reached a much higher estimate of $504
billion, which is six times higher than Florence et al.’s estimate, even when
adjusted to 2015 dollars. 255 The CEA expanded Florence et al.’s study and
made efforts to take into account the following additional factors: (1) the
worsening of the crisis since Florence et al.’s study; (2) the increasing role
of heroin abuse in the crisis; (3) evidence suggesting that fatality statistics
understate the number of opioid-related deaths; and (4) the value of lives
lost beyond earnings losses. 256 One particularly notable difference, the
CEA’s study included fatal and nonfatal measurements of heroin use,
along with prescription opioid use, in evaluating the cost of the opioid
crisis. 257
With respect to fatalities, the CEA
diverge[d] from the previous literature by quantifying the costs of
opioid-related overdose deaths based on . . . the ‘value of a statistical
life’ (VSL). Federal agencies routinely rely on VSL measures in health
and safety settings when estimating the expected fatality risk-reduction
benefits of a proposed regulation, policy, or program . . . Such valuations
are typically based on how individuals trade off wealth for reduced
mortality risks. 258

The CEA calculated the estimated VSL under four alternate
252. Id. (internal citations omitted).
253. Id.
254. THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, The Underestimated Cost of the Opioid Crisis (Nov.
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/The Underestimated Cost of
the Opioid Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AWV-EEZD] [hereinafter CEA].
255. Id. at 1.
256. Id. at 1–3.
257. Id. at 1.
258. Id. at 3.
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assumptions, ultimately preferring an age-dependent assumption drawn
from a 2003 study by Aldy and Viscusi. 259 The age-dependent calculation
assumes that individuals between twenty-five and forty-four years old
“place the greatest value on fatality risk reduction,” while those between
ages eighteen and twenty-four, and forty-four and sixty-two, place lower
values on risk reduction. 260 Using that assumption, the CEA estimated
total fatality costs of $431.7 billion. 261
To get there, CEA took the number of “officially reported opioidinvolved overdose deaths in the United States” in 2015 from the CDC
WONDER Database—approximately 33,000—and created a distribution
of the deaths by age. 262 Because recent research suggested that opioidrelated overdoses are underreported on death certificates, 263 the CEA
accordingly adjusted the number of deaths in 2015, increasing the estimate
to approximately 41,000. 264 Using various possible alternate assumptions
of VSL, the CEA estimated that the fatality cost of opioid overdoses
ranged “from a low of $211.6 billion to a high of $549.8 billion.” 265 The
preferred age-dependent VSL assumption yielded an estimate cost of
$431.7 billion for opioid fatalities. 266 This is because the epidemic’s
fatalities are concentrated in the age groups that have high valuations for
risk reduction. 267
With respect to nonfatal opioid misuse, the CEA calculated the costs
in two steps: (1) First, CEA used Florence et al.’s “estimates to obtain a
per-person measure of costs” of those who did not die within the year; (2)
second, that per-person cost was multiplied by “the number of individuals
with an opioid use disorder in 2015. . . .” 268 Accounting for inflation since
2013, the CEA estimated that the average individual with an opioid
259. Id. at 6 (citing W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003)).
260. Id. at 5.
261. Id. at 5–6.
262. Id. at 5.
263. Id. at 6 (“[R]ecent research has found that opioids are underreported on death
certificates. . . . [I]n 2014, opioid-involved overdose deaths were 24 percent higher than officially
reported. We apply this adjustment to the 2015 data, resulting in an estimated 41,033 overdose deaths
involving opioids. We apply this adjustment uniformly over the age distribution of fatalities.”) (citing
Christopher J. Ruhm,Geographic Variation in Opiod and Heroin Involved Drug Poisoning Mortality
Rates, 53 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 745 (2017), https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S07493797(17)30313-6/pdf.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 6–7.
266. Id. at 6.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 7.
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disorder cost his/her community $30,000. 269 That estimate of the average
cost then was applied to the 2.4 million individuals with opioid disorders
in 2015, estimating the total cost of nonfatal opioid misuse to be $72.3
billion. 270 The CEA, although using Florence et al.’s estimates in its
calculations, applied them to both prescription and heroin use disorders. 271
That divergence may result in the CEA’s study “understat[ing] the cost of
nonfatal consequences of heroin as criminal justice system costs may be
higher for illicit drugs . . . than for prescription drugs.” 272 But “only 14
percent of the 2.4 million individuals with an opioid use disorder in 2015
presented with a heroin use disorder in isolation; others either had a
prescription opioid disorder or both disorders present.” 273 Thus, those
individuals would have been accounted for in the Florence et al. study. 274
Accordingly, the CEA did not believe that the total cost estimate was
significantly biased. 275
In sum, the CEA combined the estimated fatality costs and nonfatality
costs to conclude that the total cost of the opioid crisis, including both
prescription and illicit opioids, was between $293.3 billion and $622.1
billion. 276 The preferred age-dependent VSL calculation resulted in the
estimated total cost being $504 billion. 277 As noted above, that estimate is
significantly higher than Florence et al.’s, as well as two earlier studies by
Birnbaum et al. 278 One, conducted in 2006, estimating costs for 2001,
came to $11.5 billion in 2015 dollars. 279 The other, conducted in 2001,
estimating costs for 2007, came to $61.5 billion in 2015 dollars. 280 Both
Birnbaum et al. studies were limited to prescription opioids. 281

269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 8.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (citing Howard G. Birnbaum et. al., Estimated Costs of Prescription Opioid Analgesic
Abuse in the United States in 2001: A Societal Perspective, 22 CLINICAL J. OF PAIN 667 (2006),
https://insights.ovid.com/pubmed?pmid=16988561).
280. Id. (citing Howard G. Birnbaum et. al., Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse,
Dependence, and Misuse in the United States, 12 PAIN MED. 657 (Apr. 2011),
https://academic.oup.com/painmedicine/article/12/4/657/1869828 [https://perma.cc/98L3-T556]).
281. Id.
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3. Missouri Hospital Association and Hospital Industry Data Institute,
Economic Costs of Opioid Epidemic in Missouri
More recently, Missouri and the Hospital Industry Data Institute
(HIDI) conducted a study of opioid costs for a single state. The Economic
Cost of the Opioid Epidemic in Missouri, published in January 2018, used
the CEA’s methodology with updated CDC mortality data to estimate the
economic burden of the opioid crisis at the state level, focusing on
Missouri in 2016. 282
Missouri’s fatality costs were “derived by applying age-dependent
estimates of the [VSL] to the . . . opioid overdose deaths for each age
category from the CDC WONDER database.” 283 Like the CEA’s report,
HIDI adjusted the measures on CDC WONDER database to reflect the
estimated twenty-four percent underreporting of opioid deaths. 284 HIDI’s
estimated nationwide economic costs of opioid-related fatalities came to
$544 billion in 2016, “compared to the CEA’s fatality cost estimate of
$431.7 billion in 2015.” 285 Thus, the study suggests “a 26 percent
increase, which is largely explained by the 29 percent increase in opioid
overdose deaths and 1.3 percent [U.S.] inflation between 2015 and
2016.” 286
The CEA’s nonfatality costs were derived from Florence et al.’s
estimate that individuals with opioid abuse/dependence cost “$30,000 per
person in the form of reduced productivity, increased consumption of
health care, law enforcement, and social services.” 287 The most
“significant” deviation from the CEA study was the used of state-level
SAMSHA data on heroin use, rather than the CEA’s data on both
prescription and illicit opioid use. 288 The SAMSHA data were preferable
because the Missouri study sought to “estimate between-state variation in
the economic burden of opioid use disorder”. 289 SAMSHA’s surveygenerated data revealed that 882,000 American adults reported using
heroin between 2015 and 2016, compared to the CEA’s 2.4 million

282. See generally The Economic Cost of the Opioid Epidemic in Missouri, HOSP. INDUS. DATA
INST. at 1–2 (Jan. 2018), https://www.mhanet.com/mhaimages/HIDIHealthStats/Feb2018Health
Stats_Special_OpioidsEconomy.pdf [https://perma.cc/89AA-WZJG].
283. Id. at 3.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. (citing Florence et al., supra note 220).
288. Id. at 3–4.
289. Id. at 3.
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estimate. 290 Although about two-thirds lower, the HIDI study noted that
the nonfatality costs were just “15 percent of the total economic costs of
opioid use disorder in the CEA study.” 291 As a result, HIDI’s “estimated
nonfatality costs in the U.S. totaled $27.3 billion in 2016, compared to the
CEA’s estimate of $72.3 billion in 2015.” 292
Adding the fatality and non-fatality opioid-related costs, the HIDI
study estimated the “total economic cost of opioid use disorder and
overdose deaths . . . to be $571.5 billion in 2016,” which was “13 percent
higher than the CEA’s estimate of $504 billion in 2015.” 293 Overall, the
study concluded that the cost represented “3.1 percent of the national GDP
of $18.5 trillion” for 2016. 294
HIDI then calculated state-level costs in Missouri, estimating that the
opioid epidemic produced $519 million in nonfatality costs (considering
only heroin use) and $12.1 billion in fatality-related costs, for a total of
$12.63 billion in 2016, or “4.22 percent of the state’s total GDP.” 295 That
estimate placed Missouri “in the fourth quintile nationally,” and the “15thhighest among the fifty states and the District of Columbia in terms of the
total burden of opioid use disorder as a percent of overall economic
activity.” 296
4. Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Opioid-Related
Overdose Deaths in Massachusetts by Industry and Occupation
Another state-level study that is potentially relevant to ours is a
Massachusetts study of opioid-related deaths from 2011 to 2015. 297 The
Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) used information on
state death certificates to explore different factors contributing to the
differences in rates of fatal opioid overdose among workers in different
industries and occupations. 298 Based on ICD-10 codes, the MDPH
identified death certificates for opioid-related overdose deaths. 299
290. Id. at 4.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 5.
296. Id.
297. See generally Opioid-Related Overdose Deaths in Massachusetts by Industry and
Occupation, 2011–2015, MASS. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH (Aug. 2018), https://www.mass.gov/
files/documents/2018/08/15/opioid-industry-occupation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WDB-E7XC].
298. See id. at 1.
299. Id. at 2 (“[C]odes were selected from the underlying cause of death field to identify all
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Additional death certificates were identified by searching the cause of
death text fields for opioid-related terms for deaths, even if the death
certificate did not receive an opioid-related death code. 300 This process
revealed “a total of 5,580 opioid-related overdose deaths in Massachusetts
from 2011 to 2015.” 301
Of those identified certificates, 191 were excluded because they
belonged to out-of-state residents, 319 were excluded because their
occupation was “homemaker,” 208 were excluded because they “were
unemployed or had never been employed,” 199 were excluded because
they “were unable to work due to disability or another reason,” 160 were
excluded because their occupation was “student,” and 2 were excluded
because they were children. 302 Another “199 individuals were excluded
because their death certificates” did not provide enough information to
classify them according to their employment “industry or occupation.” 303
That left 4,302 deaths that were usable for the study. 304 The industries and
occupations of the deceased were classified according to the North
American Industry Classification System and the Standard Occupational
Classification System respectively. 305
The study found that “[t]he opioid-related death rate for those
employed in construction and extraction occupation was six times the
average rate for all Massachusetts workers.” 306 “Construction and
extraction workers accounted for more than 24% of all opioid-related
deaths among the working population” studied. 307 Ninety-seven percent
of that population were employed in construction. 308 The rate of opioidrelated deaths for workers in farming, fishing, and forestry “was more than
5 times the average rate for Massachusetts workers.” 309 Seventy-four
percent of those studied within this group worked in fishing
occupations. 310 “Other occupations with significantly higher than average
rates of opioid-related deaths . . . included: material moving occupations;
poisonings/overdoses: X40-X49, X60-X69, X85-X90, Y10-Y19, and Y35.2. . . . [And] were then used
to identify opioid-related overdose deaths: T40.0-T40.4 and T40.6.” (citations omitted)).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
306. Id. at 1.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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installation, maintenance, and repair occupations; transportation
occupations; production occupations; food preparation and serving related
occupations; building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations;
and healthcare support occupations.” 311
Analyzed based on sex of workers, the study found that occupations
with higher-than-average rates of fatal opioid-related overdoses for men
included farming, fishing, and forestry; construction and extraction; and
material moving. 312 While occupations with higher than average rates of
fatal opioid-related overdose for women included healthcare support and
food preparation and service. 313
Overall, “the rate of fatal opioid-related overdose was higher among
workers employed in industries and occupations known to have high rates
of work-related injuries and illness,” perhaps explained by the use of
opioids to deal with “acute and chronic pain following work-related
injury.” 314 The study concluded that more research would be needed to
characterize the contributions of such factors to opioid misuse and
overdose. 315 The study did not further correlate Massachusetts opioids
deaths with costs, including lost productivity or other financial impacts.
5. Georgia Studies on Opioid Impact
Finally, two Georgia studies are potentially informative, yet still fail
to capture the cost impact of opioids at the city or county level in any
meaningful way. First, the Georgia Department of Public Health (DPH),
Opioid Overdose Surveillance 316 included a study of death certificates,
similar to the Massachusetts study. DPH derived data of opioid and
overdose-related deaths from “the death certificates of all deaths occurring
in Georgia during 2016” that were in DPH’s Vital Records. 317 Drug
overdoses included “prescription, over-the-counter, or illicit drugs.” 318
DPH looked for death certificates with ICD-10 codes with opioids
(prescription and illicit) as the underlying cause of death; those with ICD10 codes that had multiple cause-of-death codes (specifically T40.0311. Id. (exact rates excluded).
312. Id. at 1, 11.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1.
315. Id. at 20.
316. GA. DEP’T. PUB. HEALTH,
OPIOID OVERDOSE SURVEILLANCE (2016),
https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/OPIOID%20OVERDOSE%20SURVEILLANCE
.Georgia.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX5B-CVMW] [hereinafter DPH 2016].
317. Id. at 4.
318. Id.
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T40.4, T40.6); and those with any “cause of death text field” containing
certain keywords (e.g. heroine, fentanyl, acetyl fentanyl, furanyl fentanyl,
methadone, etc.). 319 “Nonfatal overdose counts were derived from
Georgia hospital discharge inpatient and [emergency department] visit
data, and included all [emergency department] visits or hospitalizations
occurring in a non-federal acute care hospital in Georgia . . . with a
discharge diagnosis indicating acute drug overdose during 2016.” 320 DPH
looked for ICD-10CM codes as the principle diagnosis (T40.0X–T40.3X,
T40.60, & T40.69) and a sixth character (“1-4, and a 7th character of A or
missing”). 321 From this data, the study concluded that “[f]rom 2010 to
2016, . . . opioid-involved overdose deaths increased in Georgia by
117%.” 322 Moreover, in 2016 there were 2,895 emergency department
visits related to opioid overdoses, and 2,499 inpatient hospitalizations
related with opioid overdoses. 323
2016 is the only completed study, but DPH has collected similar data
for 2017 324 and part of 2018, 325 including a county-level data on fatal and
nonfatal overdoses for 2017. 326 While these data are salient, their
usefulness in estimating city or county-level costs are limited for reasons
explained more fully below. 327 The hospital emergency department and
acute care costs are not particularly relevant because cities and counties
generally do not pay for hospital services, other than under limited
circumstances, discussed more fully below. 328 Overdose mortality data
are very helpful in deriving coroner costs associated with opioid-related
deaths but are harder to translate into other meaningful local government
costs.
Second, the Substance Abuse and Research Alliance (SARA) 2017
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 3, 6.
Id. at 3, 20.
GA. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, OPIOID OVERDOSE SURVEILLANCE: PRELIMINARY REPORT,
GEORGIA, 2017 (2017), https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/2017%20Preliminary
%20Georgia%20Opioid%20Overdose%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C7F-AR8W].
325. See GA. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, Drug Overdose Syndromic Surveillance Monthly Reports,
https://dph.georgia.gov/drug-overdose-syndromic-surveillance-monthly-reports
[https://perma.cc/
SD4K-HHH8] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
326. GA. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, OPIOID OVERDOSE SURVEILLANCE COUNTY LEVEL DATA
TABLES, GEORGIA, 2017 (2017), https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/2017%
20Preliminary%20Georgia%20Opioid%20Overdose%20Data%20tables%2012.19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BV76-YWZ6].
327. See generally infra Part IV.
328. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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White Paper, Prescription Opioids and Heroin Epidemic in Georgia,
provides a comprehensive overview of the scope of the problem in
Georgia, with limited mention of costs. 329 SARA is a program of the
Georgia Prevention Project. 330 The study was initiated “in April of
2016 . . . to assist the Georgia State Senate Study Committee on Opioids
and Heroin.” 331 SARA found that 900, or 68%, of the 1,307 drug overdose
deaths in Georgia in 2015 were due to opioid overdoses including
heroin. 332 “Further,” Georgia experienced “a statistically significant
increase in the drug overdose death rate . . . from 2013 to 2014, and
overdose deaths tripled between 1999 and 2013.” 333 Georgia is “[a]mong
the top 11 states with the most prescription opioid overdose deaths,” and
“55 of Georgia’s 159 counties had higher drug overdose rates than the U.S.
average in 2014.” 334 Georgia’s rural counties are especially impacted.335
“Sixty percent of the 55 counties with drug overdose rates higher than the
national average are located in rural areas.” 336 Those areas already
struggle to provide access to substance use disorder treatment, including
medication assisted treatment (MAT). 337 SARA estimated that “twothirds of all counties in Georgia,” and more than three-quarters of rural
counties, “have limited or no access to an evidence-based practice for
opioid use disorder.” 338
Regarding costs, the study briefly noted that “[t]he economic burden
of prescription opioid overdose, misuse and disorders in the U.S. is
estimated at $78.5 billion in 2013 with over one third of this amount
coming from increased health care and substance use treatment costs
($28.9 billion).” 339 The study went on to note that “[t]he health care costs
associated with opioid misuse in Georgia alone were estimated at $447
million in 2007 with estimated per-capita costs at $44.” 340 That amount,
according to some estimates, represents an eighty percent increase since
329. SUBSTANCE ABUSE RES. ALLIANCE, PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS AND HEROIN EPIDEMIC IN
GEORGIA—A WHITE PAPER (2017), http://www.senate.ga.gov/sro/Documents/StudyCommRpts/
OpioidsAppendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL6L-FYPS] [hereinafter SARA 2017].
330. Id. at 3.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 5.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 5, 23.
338. Id. at 5 (noting that “77 percent of rural counties in Georgia have limited or no access to an
evidence-based practice for opioid use disorder”).
339. Id. at 7.
340. Id.
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2007. 341 “Hospitalizations related to opioid use and misuse in Georgia
also have skyrocketed, from about 302,000 in 2002 to about 520,000 in
2012.” 342 Moreover, SARA suggested that inpatient care costs “more than
doubled” from 2002 to 2012, “rising to $15 billion in 2012.” 343 Again,
even accepting the accuracy of those reports, the figures do little to capture
city- and county-level costs associated with the opioid epidemic. For local
government plaintiffs to demonstrate damages in the litigation, or even for
other local governments to develop meaningful budgets and other plans to
address it, more specific cost estimates are needed.
B. Limits of Existing Cost Studies for Assessing Local Government
Costs
The aforementioned research, while helpful in understanding the
macro-impacts of opioid abuse, ultimately do little to help Georgia local
governments assess their specific costs in dealing with this problem. First,
at least for purposes of litigation, local governments are trying to measure
only direct, rather than direct and indirect, costs. Second, estimates based
on national averages cannot be applied to individual cases. The following
discussion briefly explains the limits of the existing studies, highlighting
the need for our project.
Florence et al., CEA, and HIDI all estimate the cost of the opioid
epidemic from loss of life, which represents the largest impact of the crisis.
Those costs, however, are not direct losses for local governments. The
direct costs from opioid deaths for a local government would be potential
lost sales and property tax revenue, i.e., the deceased person not
purchasing taxable goods. Theoretically, the government could estimate
that lost sales tax income by using data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey. 344 That consumer spending
data, however, represents average spending nationally or for a region of
the county; thus, again it reveals little about any individual city or county.
Additionally, local governments would be making assumptions about the
potential earnings and expenditures of specific persons who died from
opioid overdoses in their jurisdictions and the residential duration of the
deceased in their respective communities. A local government would
likely have trouble verifying any purported lost sales tax based on those
vague assumptions.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 7, 15.
344. See Bureau LAB. STAT., Consumer Expenditure Surveys, https://www.bls.gov/cex/
[https://perma.cc/3KHE-8KWW] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
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Foregone or diminished property taxes from drug overdoses are even
less likely. Property taxes would be lost only if, first, the person who died
from an overdose owned property, and, second, the owned property
declined in value because the person died. Assuming that the deceased
were a property owner, there is no reason to think that simply because a
person died of an opioid overdose that her property would be of less worth
any more than if a person died of some other cause, such as a heart attack
or cancer. Property taxes could be adversely affected by the opioid crisis
if a neighborhood experienced an overall decline in desirability, such as
having significant blight or high numbers of home foreclosures.345 Even
so, it would be difficult to attribute those impacts to opioids alone. Those
same neighborhood challenges are more typically the result of high
unemployment and other socioeconomic challenges which may contribute
to higher rates of opioid abuse but cannot be attributed to the drug problem
in isolation.346 A local government would have difficulty determining
whether a neighborhood is in decline because of opioid abuse or these
other societal problems, which are often the antecedents to widespread
drug addiction.
Florence et al. also considered the economic cost of general lost
productivity from opioid addiction, such as absenteeism and persons being
incarcerated. Again, local governments would not be able to consider lost
productivity of its entire population as direct costs. Lost productivity is
different from the direct costs of incarceration which are considered in our
study.
The Florence et al., CEA, and HIDI studies measure the direct costs
to law enforcement and the courts from opioid addiction. To be sure, local
governments bear significant portions of those costs, including time of
police officers, sheriff deputies, jails, and courts.
Nonetheless,
methodological problems prevent local governments from applying the
averages used in those studies to estimate law enforcement costs.
Nonetheless, the averages used in those studies to estimate law
enforcement costs cannot be applied to individual local governments for
their individual cost estimations because of methodological problems.
Namely, national averages, such as the percent of property crime
associated with drug use, are based on many inputs. Any particular local
345. See, e.g., Press Release, Ohio House of Representatives 133rd Gen. Assembly, Bipartisan
“Blight Bill” Would Protect Neighborhoods from Dangerous Properties, Lawmaker Says (Jan. 26,
2018), http://www.ohiohouse.gov/adam-c-miller/press/bipartisan-blight-bill-would-protect-neighbor
hoods-from-dangerous-properties-lawmaker-says [https://perma.cc/TJZ7-MVDJ].
346. Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic
Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 182–84 (Feb. 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC5846593/pdf/AJPH.2017.304187.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF67-YH35].
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government may or may not be similar to the national average because of
variations in community income, unemployment, major industries, and
other factors.
The MDPH study that examined industries with higher rates of opioid
addiction offers interesting information, but does not help local
governments estimate their direct expenditures due to opioid abuse.
Rather, this study appears most helpful in understanding potential causes
of opioid addiction and offering insights for focused drug abuse prevention
education and other interventions in certain industries. In communities
with industries associated with higher rates of opioid addiction, local
governments could direct efforts to work with those industry and union
leaders to educate employees about potential opioid addiction and employ
other targeted prevention and treatment efforts.
Since the MDPH study did not indicate that local government
employees experience a higher rate of opioid addiction, the study is not
instructive on city or county human resources costs for public employees’
opioid use disorders. The study does not suggest particularly pronounced
direct costs on local governments as an employer in terms of medical and
substance abuse treatment, or high employee attrition or lost productivity.
Even assuming opioid addiction among employees were an issue for a
local government, the MDPH methodology does not help to quantify costs.
The local government human resource department still would need to pull
employee health records based on ICD-10 codes 347 and apply other
methodologies discussed below. 348
Florence et al., CEA, HID, DPH 2016, and SARA 2017 all look at
health care costs associated with opioid addiction. Those costs, while a
significant component of the epidemic, largely are not applicable to cities
and counties in Georgia because they generally do not pay for hospital
services, other than under limited circumstances, including gratuitous
uncompensated care grants to safety net hospitals, city and county
employee health costs, and prisoner medical expenses at the local hospital.
We unpack the various health care expenditures more fully in Part IV.
The overdose mortality data provided in the Georgia studies, DPH
2016, and SARA 2017, may be helpful to local governments in estimating
coroner costs, which are somewhat standardized, but are harder to translate
into other meaningful cost estimates.
347. See Using International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Codes to Assess Opioid-Related
Overdose Deaths, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. CTR. FOR THE
APPLICATION OF PREVENTION TECH., https://mnprc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/using-icd-10codes-to-assess-opioid-related-overdose-deaths.pdf [https://perma.cc/J838-9ETE] (last visited Apr.
22, 2019).
348. See infra Part IV.A.
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In sum, the applicability of these existing studies on the cost of opioid
addiction to local governments for calculating direct cost estimates is
either extremely limited because of the generalizations used in the research
or simply because local governments do not bear the burden of the
expense, such as health care.
IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPIOID COST STUDY
With that background on the opioid litigation and existing studies
estimating macro-level costs and state-level incidence of opioid use
disorder, we turn now to describing our study methodology and findings.
The goal of the study was not to derive quantifiable hard data on the three
counties’ opioids costs or to create damages claims that would be
admissible in court. Rather, we sought to reality test our existing
understanding of local government operations, budgeting, and planning to
better understand where the costs of this epidemic might appear. We
looked beyond the Florence et al. categories of health care, law
enforcement, and lost productivity to capture a broader array of potential
local government costs. Moreover, we sought on-the-ground experiences
and anecdotes from department heads, rather than extrapolating from
statistical studies, to more fully understand the financial impact of the
opioid epidemic at the local level. Our findings may be useful to MDL
and other litigants but also other local governments seeking to get a better
grasp on the effect of this issue on their operations so that they can make
appropriate budget and planning decisions going forward.
A. Methodology
Our study consisted of unstructured qualitative interviews with two
dozen identified local government department heads in three Georgia
counties, as well as a handful other governmental and non-profit
organizations’ representatives, suggested by other interviewees through
informal snowball sampling. In each of the three counties, we made initial
contact with the County Administrator, who is the chief executive officer
of the county responsible for the day-to-day operations of the county.
After the County Administrators agreed to participate in our study, we
asked them to contact the relevant department heads, alerting them to our
project and asking for their cooperation. With that introduction, we then
contacted and requested interviews with administrative heads of the
following units: Coroner, Law Enforcement (Police, Drug Enforcement
Authority (DEA)), Correctional Institute (typically run by the Sheriff),
Court Administration (a local governmental unit overseeing various
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courts), Parks and Recreation/Leisure Services, Libraries, Treatment
Services, Human Resources, Finance/Budget, Hospitals, Emergency
Communications (911), Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Code
Enforcement, Solicitor General (Prosecutor), Fire, Solid Waste, and
Community Services. We also reached out to representatives of the local
private, non-profit hospitals and, in one case, the school superintendent.
We selected the three counties by the mostly unscientific method of
localities that were plaintiffs in the opioid MDL and where we had
preexisting contacts with the County Administrators or other officials and,
thus, a better chance of response and cooperation. The three Georgia
counties surveyed were Athens-Clarke (where the University of Georgia
is located, and which has a combined city-county government), 349 Hall
(County Seat: Gainesville), 350 and Decatur (County Seat: Bainbridge). 351
Subject to the opportunities above, the three counties were chosen for their
diversity: Decatur County is very rural, located in southwest Georgia.
Athens-Clarke and Hall are in northeast Georgia; the former is fairly
urban/suburban while the latter is mix of urban and rural. In total, we
interviewed twenty-six local government administrators in the three
counties and five non-local-governmental administrators, including the
Decatur County school superintendent; the executive director of Decatur
County’s private, nonprofit hospital; the director of government affairs for
the private nonprofit health system serving Hall County; a representative
of the private EMS company that serves Decatur County; and a
representative of the drug treatment center for Hall county, for a total
survey of thirty-one people. Each interview lasted from thirty minutes to
one hour. Most interviews were conducted by phone, although several of
the Athens-Clarke County interviews were in-person.
The officials with whom we spoke represented services that we
believed would experience direct, indirect, or even intangible or future
costs related to opioid use. In describing the limits of existing opioid
financial impact studies above, we focused on direct costs, which would
be most relevant to the litigation. For purposes of this study, however, we
wanted to collect as much information as possible, given the multiple aims.
Thus, we included those services that are typically mentioned when
considering the cost of opioids—jails, courts, fire departments, EMS, and
hospitals—but also those that have received less attention such as libraries,
349. Athens-Clark
County
Unified
Gov’t.,
https://www.athensclarkecounty.com
[https://perma.cc/VF2V-GDLB] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
350. Hall County Georgia, https://www.hallcounty.org [https://perma.cc/4VLE-5K4H] (last
visited Apr. 22, 2019).
351. Welcome
to
Decatur
County
Georgia,
https://www.decaturcountyga.gov
[https://perma.cc/TUW9-SZ4Q] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
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parks, solid waste, human resources, and code enforcement. In total, our
interviews include representatives from seventeen different local
government or non-profit services.
We were fairly strict in our identification of truly local government
costs, which meant that we did not collect information about some costs
alleged repeatedly in the complaints. For example, the complaints allege
costs associated with child care for children of parents suffering opioidrelated addiction or incapacitation.352 Those costs, however, typically do
not fall on local governments in Georgia. The Division of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) and foster care are state-funded 353 (aside from
some targeted local programs, captured elsewhere in our study). Likewise,
school districts, which could incur costs associated with children of
opioid-affected parents, are separately funded by local property taxes and
a state supplement to underfunded counties; thus, school districts are not
part of city and county government budgets. 354 The complaints also
alleged opioid-related medical treatment for both opioid-addicted babies
and adults. 355 We did speak to hospitals, even though a very small fraction
(if any) of their revenue may come from local governments, such as where
localities have expressly granted indigent care funds to safety net
hospitals. 356 Some community hospitals operate under state law 357
allowing the issuance of revenue bonds or certificates to fund construction
or other projects. 358 But, like school districts, hospital authorities are
separate legal and budget entities. Otherwise, Medicare (federal),
Medicaid (state and federal), and private (insurers or charity) would be
paying for such treatment. With respect to the complaints regarding
opioid-affected babies and NAS, 359 the bulk of neonatal intensive care unit
352. See supra note 14.
353. GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., JOINT APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE PRESENTATION FY
2016 AMENDED AND FY 2017 GENERAL BUDGET 20–28 (Jan. 19, 2016), http://dhs.georgia.gov/
sites/dhs.georgia.gov/files/AFY16%20and%20FY17%20Budget%20-%20Joint%20Approriations%
20Committee%20Presentation%20as%20of%201-19-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHX4-3F75]; Melissa
Johnson, Georgia Human Services Budget Primer for State Fiscal Year 2018, GA. BUDGET & POL’Y
INST. (July 12, 2017), http://gbpi.org/2017/georgia-human-services-budget-primer-state-fiscal-year2018/ [https://perma.cc/6UCL-4RUP].
354. ELTON DAVIS & ISABEL Ruthotto, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL FIN., FINANCING GEORGIA’S
SCHOOLS: A 2015 BRIEFING 12 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://cslf.gsu.edu/files/2015/10/Financing-GeorgiasSchools_October-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z46K-K5WX].
355. See supra note 14.
356. See, e.g., Indigent Care, FLOYD STRAIGHTFORWARD, http://floydstraightforward.org/
relevant-topic/indigent-care/ [https://perma.cc/A2XP-56JX] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019) (noting that a
number of counties do receive local government funding, but Floyd County does not).
357. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-72 (West 2010).
358. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-78 (West 2010).
359. See supra note 14.
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costs for infants, as well as other emergency room and inpatient costs of
treatment, would fall on hospitals ledgers, with minimal to no city or
county funding. Likewise, local public health departments in Georgia are
state funded. 360
At the same time, we cast a wider net than the damages alleged in the
lawsuits, seeking to identify not only documented costs associated with
opioids but the full range of past and potential future financial impacts of
this crisis. Thus, we imagined law enforcement costs associated with not
only drug crimes and overdoses but also related crimes (shoplifting, theft,
housing code violations). In addition, it is conceivable that libraries will
be managing indigent, impaired, or even overdosing clients as places of
public access. 361 We included parks and leisure to capture costs associated
with homeless camps and needle clean-up. 362 Solid waste was included
because of the possibility of needles or other opioid-related contaminants
ending up in wastewater and sewage treatment plants. 363 We ended up not
interviewing any representatives of those departments, however, after
anecdotal reports that any such problem in Georgia was nascent at best.
Likewise, we considered reaching out to local government planning
departments to assess potential lost opportunities for economic
development, but, again, aside from anecdotes, there seemed little specific
data to report, at least at this time. 364 Because of the open-ended nature of
our interviews, we also discovered other potential opioid-related costs that
we had not previously identified.

360. GA. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://georgia.gov/agencies/georgia-department-public-health
[https://perma.cc/3A6S-SXL2] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
361. See Trisha Noack & Roberta Koscielski, Peoria Public Library, How the Opiate Epidemic
Came to the Library, 36 ILL. LIBR. ASS’N REP. 4, 4 (Aug. 2018), https://www.ila.org/
content/documents/reporter_0818.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMV4-BYNM].
362. See Gigen Mammoser, Opioid Epidemic Contributing to the Problem of Used Needles
Littering Streets, Parks, Beaches, HEALTHLINE (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.healthline.com/healthnews/used-needles-littering-streets-parks-beaches [https://perma.cc/U44E-QAJK].
363. See Susan Scutti, Mussels in Washington’s Puget Sound Test Positive for Opioids, Other
Drugs, CNN (May 25, 2018, 9:15 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/25/health/mussels-opioidsbn/index.html [https://perma.cc/2XRR-WE9L]. An analysis of city sewage can provide useful
information for public health epidemiology and intervention. See Keridwen Cornelius, Sewage Is
Helping Cities Flush Out the Opioid Crisis, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (May 25, 2018),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/sewage-is-helping-cities-flush-out-the-opioid-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/DK35-ZAXD].
364. See, e.g., Stephen Fowler, The Cost of Opioid Addiction Is More Than Dollars and Cents,
GA. PUB. BROADCASTING (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.gpbnews.org/post/cost-opioid-addictionmore-dollars-and-cents [https://perma.cc/XF5D-83CF] (discussing the economic effects of opioid
abuse, such as “unfilled jobs and failed drug tests.”).
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B. Findings
We predicted that identified costs would fall into one of three
categories: (1) “easy,” readily identified opioid-related costs that cities and
counties already are tracking; (2) “medium,” potentially identifiable
opioid-related costs that cities and counties could track if given the tools
and resources (e.g., spreadsheets, templates, or additional data collection
fields or information feedback loops); and (3) “hard,” indirect and
intangible costs that are real but very difficult to quantify other than on a
macro level. As it turned out, we found relatively few categories of “easy”
costs; a larger bucket of “medium” costs; and an indefinite number of
“hard” costs.
Those results suggests that local government plaintiffs may be
challenged to demonstrate damages for purposes of the MDL lawsuit or
settlement. Indeed, early indications from the MDL suggest that the task
has been harder than expected, with at least one ninety-day extension
already granted on the Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet, docketed on June
19, 2018. 365 That discovery request calls for extensive, detailed
disclosures all dating back ten years, including a much longer list of
officials, ranging from mayors and councilmembers, to wardens and fire
chiefs; annual budgets and actual expenditures for each category of
damages claimed; claim-specific information, including each doctor and
pharmacy that has been the target of a law enforcement or administrative
investigation; number of overdose deaths and drug(s) involved; and every
medical insurance plan or carrier, behavioral health carrier, workers
compensation program, pharmacy benefit manager and other third-party
administrator. 366 The Fact Sheet also calls for supporting documents,
including dispensing, prescribing, and distribution records, city council,
county commission, and county health commission meeting minutes,
again dating back ten years. 367
The original ninety-day deadline for this production expired on
September 18, 2018 (just a few days before this live symposium was held),
but was extended for another ninety days, until December 17, 2018,
suggesting that response was perhaps more challenging for government
plaintiffs than initially anticipated. 368 Further extensions were granted to
365. Fact Sheet Implementation Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D.
Ohio June 19, 2018), ECF No. 638.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Order on Discovery in Track One Cases, and Amending Prior Orders at 7, In re: Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Lit., No. 17-MD-2804.
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various localities affected by natural disasters, including fires in California
and hurricanes on the East and Gulf Coasts. 369 As the case proceeds, the
plaintiffs may find that their participation is not costless, data is difficult
to collect, and the demonstrable costs for any particular locality are
modest. As just one indication, a local government lawsuit filed in
Connecticut state court was dismissed on standing grounds because the
city plaintiffs could not demonstrate cognizable injury. 370 Thus, our local
government cost study remains highly salient as it relates to the litigation
specifically, and local government planning more generally.
Our findings confirm the suggestion above that local governments will
face significant challenges in trying to fully capture all service costs
associated with the opioid epidemic. That said, local governments should
be able to quantify some direct costs, assuming multiple funding streams
(federal, state, local, and private) can be disaggregated. In terms of how
to determine costs, the primary challenge will be tracking service effort.
How much of a provided service was directly or indirectly related to opioid
use? Once service effort is known, calculating costs from that effort
should be relatively straight forward, such as total hourly cost of
employees’ time, or better yet, cost per service episode that involved
opioids.
Data management is also a critical factor in a local government’s
ability to track costs. Resource and personnel limits alone create
significant challenges for local government plaintiffs to respond to the
detailed MDL Fact Sheet or other inquiries. Those governments that have
had the resources and interest in tracking services, such as creating a
database for each prisoner that includes the reason for arrest in a
searchable format, may have an easier time researching current and past
opioid-related service costs. Smaller communities often translate to rural
and poorer local governments, which typically lack financial resources to
create and staff to manage sophisticated data management systems.
Accordingly, we anticipate that those communities will face the greatest
difficulty tracking cost data. Unfortunately, often it is these poorer
communities that are most severely impacted by the opioid epidemic as a

369. Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs’ Fact Sheets on Behalf of Ctys.
Affected by Recent Nat. Disasters, In re: Nat’l Prescription Opiate Lit., No. 17-MD-2804.
370. Connecticut Judge Dismisses Claims Against Opioid Manufacturers, FDA NEWS (Jan. 18,
2019),
https://www.fdanews.com/articles/189910-connecticut-judge-dismisses-claims-againstopioid-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/NWR6-ZRMT]; Paul Schott, Judge Dismisses Local CT
Lawsuits Against Purdue Pharma, STAMFORD ADVOC. (last updated Jan. 9, 2019, 5:57 PM),
https://www.stamfordadvocate.com/business/article/Judge-dismisses-local-CT-lawsuits-againstPurdue-13521470.php [https://perma.cc/ZB4Y-VG7Q].
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percentage of population or aggregate community impact. 371
It is important to note that opioid lawsuits address only direct
damages, those that can be quantified. 372 Governments will not be able to
recoup indirect costs such as those related to the long-term impacts on a
child whose parents are addicted and thus may be neglected. States, in
separate lawsuits, 373 may be able to track and recoup costs related to foster
care and other services but not the child’s lost potential caused by the
trauma that she experiences. Governments cannot measure the lost
economic growth and tax dollars from companies that choose not to be
located in a community because of concerns about not having an able
workforce. Moreover, local governments will not be able to recover the
opportunity costs from providing services for opioid-related issues. We
turn next to describing the three categories of costs—easy, medium, and
hard to quantify—identified through our study.
1. Easy to Quantify
We categorize opioid-related costs as “easy” to track and calculate
when existing tracking systems would readily identify opioids as being a
reason for the service effort. In most cases, that means there is an existing,
extrinsic reason to track persons who use or sell opioids, or the particular
cost is opioid-specific, such as costs associated with the opioid overdose
drug, naloxone (or Narcan). 374 For local government accounting purposes,
the need to correlate expenditures with any particular individual receiving
371. See SARA 2017, supra note 329, at 5 (regarding opioid impact in rural Georgia); Drug
Overdose in Rural America, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/ruralhealth/drug-overdose/ [https://perma.cc/
5TDJ-UF4X] (last reviewed Oct. 19, 2017).
372. See, e.g., Gov’t Plaintiff Fact Sheet, In re: Nat’l Prescription Opiate Lit., No. 17-MD-2804
(requesting information on budget and expenditures, suspicious pharmaceutical prescriptions, and
opioid-related meeting agendas).
373. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing state attorney general lawsuits);
see also Allison Sherry, Opioid Crisis Is Sure to Be Factor in the Campaign for State Attorney
General, COLO. PUB. RADIO (July 10, 2018), http://www.cpr.org/news/story/opioid-crisis-is-sure-tobe-factor-in-the-campaign-for-state-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/V8MJ-4TRE]; Press Release,
Office of Attorney Gen. Chris Carr, Carr Announces Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers and
Distributors (Jan. 3, 2019), https://law.georgia.gov/press-releases/2019-01-03/carr-announceslawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers-and-distributors [https://perma.cc/8GCA-6N34].
374. See generally Opioid Overdose Reversal with Naloxone (Narcan, Evzio), NAT’L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE (last updated Apr. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/opioid-overdosereversal-naloxone-narcan-evzio [https://perma.cc/3DC8-DNB5] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019)
(describing Naloxone and how it is administered); Surgeon General’s Advisory on Naloxone and
Opioid Overdose, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/
priorities/opioid-overdose-prevention/naloxone-advisory.html [https://perma.cc/8PT6-XNZJ] (last
visited Mar. 31, 2019) (stressing the importance of the availability of Naloxone to assist in preventing
overdoses).
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the services—much less for discrete indications—is relatively rare. For
the most part, government is in the business of providing public goods to
a population, not in the business of providing fee-for-service benefits to
particular individuals, as explained more fully below. 375 As a result of
those features of local government management and accounting, the task
of quantifying opioid-related costs turns out to be harder than we expected.
The category of easy-to-quantify costs includes court administration fees;
coroner investigations; naloxone; some medical care costs, including
EMS, services to city and county employees, and indigent care grants; and
grants or other spending earmarked for opioid treatment or related issues.
One set of costs that should be fairly easy to track are those associated
with court administration. Courts have an extrinsic reason to correlate
expenditures with opioids; namely, court administrators routinely track
cases with the associated criminal codes, which indicate the nature of the
crime and illicit substance involved. 376 Thus, opioid services are known
through the charges against the defendant. For example, the AthensClarke County Clerk of the Superior Court 377 explained that she inputs a
variety of information into her docket management system for each
defendant, including the type of Georgia criminal code violation. 378 To
find opioid-related dockets, she just has to search the specific code
number. 379 Thus, we could derive a fairly reliable cost estimate for the
court’s opioid-related services.
Starting with those data entries, we could determine the percentage of
criminal cases related to opioids. Hypothetically, let’s suppose the court’s
opioid-related effort is ten percent. Second, we would determine the
percentage of court administration total costs that are related to criminal
cases. Suppose that forty percent of the court’s administrative staff are
dedicated to criminal cases (hypothetically, two of the five total staff).
Then, the department’s total operating budget is multiplied by forty
percent, resulting in a criminal case budget. Forty percent of a
hypothetical budget of $500,000 equals $200,000. That $200,000 portion
375. See infra note 439 and accompanying text (discussing public goods and limits on the
benefits-received model of local government service delivery).
376. GA. CODE Ann. § 16-13-24 (West 2009) (establishing five schedules of controlled
substances); see id. § 16-13-25 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013) (listing Schedule I controlled substances);
see id. § 16-13-26 (listing Schedule II controlled substances and explicitly referring to opiates) (West
2009 & Supp. 2013); see also id. § 15-6-61 (listing superior court clerk’s duties).
377. See generally Superior Court, ATHENS-CLARKE CTY., https://www.athensclarkecounty
.com/579/Superior-Court [https://perma.cc/J3N3-JSKT] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019); Clerk of Superior
& State Courts, ATHENS-CLARKE CTY., https://www.athensclarkecounty.com/324/Clerk-of-SuperiorState-Courts [https://perma.cc/C2VL-C9MW] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
378. Telephone Interview with Betty Logan, Clerk of Courts, Athens-Clarke County (July 25,
2018).
379. Id.
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of the budget then is multiplied by the opioid effort of ten percent for an
opioid-related service cost of $20,000. In sum, in our hypothetical
example, opioid-related services amount to four percent of the total court
administration costs.
Fig. 1: Hypothetical Calculation of Court Costs
Total department budget: $500,000
Percentage of criminal cases involving opioids: 10% (based on docket,
criminal codes)
Percentage of total costs related to criminal cases: 40% (2 out of 5 staff)
(500,000)(40%) = $200,000
___________________________________________
(200,000)(10%) = $20,000 (opioid cases represent 4% of total budget)

Sadly, opioid-related services in a local coroner’s office also are easy
to track. Georgia Law requires all suspected overdose cases in Georgia to
be sent to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) for a toxicology
screening, which will show whether opioids were in the decedent’s system
at the time of death. 380 Costs related to an opioid overdose include the
GBI toxicology report, cost to transport the body, and local coroner’s
office staff time in locating a person who will claim the body. 381
Additional costs may be incurred when no one will claim the body and the
county must get approval from the Superior Court for a pauper burial, or
if the county must embalm and retain the body for a period of time before

380. Rhonda Cook, At the State’s Morgue, a Backlog Has Grown Amid Opioid Epidemic,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/the-state-morgue-backloghas-grown-amid-opioid-epidemic/9gtLuiR2ND6wcgcuGGpffN/ [https://perma.cc/WC2V-LRZQ];
Medical Examiner’s Office, GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://gbi.georgia.gov/medicalexaminers-office [https://perma.cc/AEW9-JNP2] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 4516-24 (West 2003 & Supp. 2015) (describing when notification to the coroner or county medical
examiner is required upon discovery of a death under listed circumstances); see id. § 45-16-25 (West
2003 & Supp. 2013) (describing coroners’ duties upon receipt of notice described in § 45-16-24); see
id. § 45-16-27 (describing when coroners shall require an inquest); see id. § 45-16-27.1 (West 2003)
(describing when autopsies are required).
381. See Frequently Asked Questions About Autopsies, GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://gbi.georgia.gov/sites/gbi.georgia.gov/files/related_files/site_page/88332299Autopsy%20FAQ
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XZM-68DD] (last visited Apr., 14, 2019) (detailing when an autopsy is
required under state law, how autopsies are paid for, the coroner’s obligation to transport the body to
and from morgue, and indicating how long an autopsy typically takes to complete).
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investigation. 382 So, again, there is a reason extrinsic to local government
function to collect the opioid-specific data related to coroners’ costs.
Another easily identifiable cost, applicable to various local
government departments, is the cost of naloxone, including the cost of
acquiring and storing the drug as well as training employees on its use.
Naloxone may be stocked by police, fire, EMS, as well as libraries and
schools (although schools are not local government costs, as explained
above). 383 Our interviews, as well as media sources, 384 revealed an
increasing number of local government departments that are stocking
naloxone and training their staff to use it. 385 For services where opioidrelated issues will be minimal, such as drug use in a public library, costs
should be limited to purchasing naloxone and training staff on how to use
it. These costs would be fairly easy to isolate: the cost of the drug and the
hourly cost of employees for the time spent in training. Any department
that purchases naloxone (e.g., police, fire/EMS) can track this direct cost
through its financial system. Furthermore, the specific training guidelines
for administering the drug ensure an easy calculation of employee time
and cost for knowing how to use it.
One caveat is that naloxone-related costs may be both over- and underinclusive with respect to actual opioid overdoses, as explained by Hall

382. DIV. OF AGING SERVS., GA. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., A GUIDE TO FUNERAL HOMES,
CREMATORIES AND CEMETERIES 8–9 (2011), http://medicalboard.georgia.gov/sites/aging.
georgia.gov/files/imported/DHR-DAS/DHR-DAS_Publications/A%20Guide%20to%20Funeral%20
Homes-2011%20FINAL%204-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8NU-MJNU] (explaining that the county
may cover burial expenses if the decedent is a “pauper and destitute of the means of paying for decent
interment.”).
383. See supra Section IV.A.
384. J. Brian Charles, Beyond Books: How Libraries Are the Latest Front in the Opioid Fight,
GOVERNING (June 12, 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-librariesopioid-epidemic-lc.html; Corey S. Davis, et al., Expanded Access to Naloxone Among Firefighters,
Police Officers, and Emergency Medical Technicians in Massachusetts, 104 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH
e7, e8 (Aug. 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4103249/pdf/AJPH.
2014.302062.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MFR-6LHM]; Soumya Karlamangla, Police Use of Naloxone
Saved a Dozen Who Overdosed in Chico, Calif., VALLEY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2019),
https://www.vnews.com/The-drug-that-saved-the-people-who-overdosed-in-Chico-22908941
[https://perma.cc/37Q9-SP8Q].
385. Hall County Library, Hall County Fire Services/EMS, Grady EMS (serving Decatur
County), and Athens-Clarke County Police Department reported stocking naloxone and training staff
to use it. Telephone interview with Lisa MacKinney, Director, Hall County Library (Aug. 13, 2018);
Telephone Interview with Randy Williams, Director of Operations, Randolph County – Grady EMS
(Aug. 1, 2018); Telephone Interview with Garry Epps, Lieutenant, Drug Task Force, Christopher
Nichols, Lieutenant, Office of Professional Standards and Recruitment, Benjamin Dickerson,
Lieutenant, Career Development & Training Unit, Athens-Clarke County Police Department (Aug. 9,
2018); Telephone Interview with Scott Bowden, Christie Grice, Division Chief, Emergency Medical
Services, and Jerry Smith, Assistant Chief, Hall County Fire Services/EMS (Aug. 24, 2018).
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County EMS. 386 That is because their protocol, adopted based on national
standards, calls for naloxone administration only if the patient is
unconscious and has a blocked airway. 387 Thus, there may be cases where
a patient actually was in cardiac arrest, unrelated to drug overdose, but
nevertheless receives naloxone. Likewise, there may be patients who have
overdosed, including on opioids, but do not receive naloxone because they
are still conscious. One reason for the relatively conservative protocol is
that the immediate withdrawal effect of naloxone can cause agitation and
aggression; thus, avoiding administration on conscious patients may be
safer for the patient and emergency responders.388 The Hall County EMS
personnel interviewed suggested that other departments, such as police,
are more liberal in their naloxone use. 389 Even if naloxone administration
exceeds actual opioid-related overdoses, it still could be fairly argued that
the costs are a result of the opioid epidemic.
For two of the services we researched, the benefit-received model for
providing government services does apply: emergency medical services
(EMS) and hospital care. These services already bill patients via health
insurance (private or public) and track uncompensated care, and,
consequentially, have systems in place for tracking costs related to
particular patient diagnoses or interventions, namely, the ICD-10 codes
described above in other cost studies. To track opioid-related costs, EMS
providers and hospitals simply would need to access existing billing and
coding records in their data management systems. That said, the
specificity and accuracy of data entries could pose a limit on the ease of
collecting these data. EMS, for example, may not specify more than
“suspected overdose,” without indicating the drug type or types. 390
Although a toxicology screen may be performed at the hospital when the
patient arrives, there is no reason intrinsic to the provision of emergency
medical treatment and transport services to report those results back to the
EMS unit. EMS is indeed a cost borne by local governments, even if the
386. Telephone Interview with Scott Bowden, Christie Grice, Division Chief, Emergency
Medical Services, and Jerry Smith, Assistant Chief, Hall County Fire Services/EMS (Aug. 24, 2018).
387. Id.
388. Id.; Daniel P. Wermeling, Review of Naloxone Safety for Opioid Overdose: Practical
Considerations for New Technology and Expanded Public Access, 6 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN
DRUG SAFETY 20, 21 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4308412/
pdf/10.1177_2042098614564776.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C8Q-F53G] (internal citation omitted)
(noting that patients “undergoing acute opioid withdrawal . . . will be agitated as they are being revived
with naloxone, thus increasing the risk of an injury to the provider.”).
389. Telephone Interview with Scott Bowden, Christie Grice, Division Chief, Emergency
Medical Services, and Jerry Smith, Assistant Chief, Hall County Fire Services/EMS (Aug. 24, 2018).
390. Telephone Interview with Randy Williams, Director of Operations, Decatur-Grady 911
(Aug. 1, 2018).
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subsequent hospital emergency department or acute care services are not.
Even with the possible service-specific coding data, the bulk of
opioid-related EMS and hospital services will be funded through sources
other than city and county governments. Patients may have private
insurance (through employers or other individual and small-group market
plans) or government health insurance (through Medicare, Medicaid, or
federal or state employee health plans) that covers most of the cost of
services provided. 391 To the extent those payors undercompensate,
hospitals already have systems in place for addressing the shortfall, which
rarely has financial implications for local governments. 392 Even in the
case of opioid-affected infants specifically identified in the local
government plaintiffs’ complaints, they would almost certainly qualify for
Medicaid coverage, a program that is jointly funded by states and the
federal government, but not cities and counties. 393
We discuss jail costs more fully below under the “medium” category,
but any hospital costs (as opposed to on-site jail infirmary) for inmates
typically are billed directly to the county, we learned. 394 Even if the inmate
is Medicaid or Medicare eligible, those third-party payors are not billed (a
point of some controversy between jail and county administration, it
seems). 395 Thus, if an inmate receives emergency medical treatment,
hospital-based detox, or other drug treatment services at the hospital
instead of at the jail, those costs would likely be easy to identify through
CPT codes as above. Those costs are discrete but likely fairly modest for
any given county.
It is possible that patients utilizing EMS or hospital services are city
or county employees, in which case those and any other associated
treatment (e.g., outpatient treatment, counseling and therapy, recovery
assistance) would be a cost to the local government if the employee is
covered by an employee health plan or workers compensation. For this
reason, we included heads of Human Resources departments for the three
counties in our interviews. 396 For government employees, some opioid391. Id.
392. Telephone Interview with Jim Lambert, CEO, Memorial Hospital and Manor, Hospital
Authority, Decatur County (July 26, 2018).
393. Financial Management, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/finance/
[https://perma.cc/H4AC-8MAL] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
394. Telephone Interview with Garry Epps, Lieutenant, Drug Task Force, Christopher Nichols,
Lieutenant, Office of Professional Standards and Recruitment, Benjamin Dickerson, Lieutenant,
Career Development & Training Unit, Athens-Clarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 2018);
Telephone Interview with Tommy York, Jail Commander, Athens-Clarke County (Aug. 10, 2018).
395. Id.
396. Telephone Interview with Michelle West, Accounting Manager, Human Resources for
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related costs are easily calculated while others would be more difficult to
capture. City and county Human Resources departments can gather
employee medical costs related to opioid-related drug treatment, drug
overdose, and other mental health and substance abuse benefits, assuming
that medical billing records are coded by drug type. 397 Local governments
may self-insure or purchase their employee health plans and workers’
compensation coverage, but the service-benefit recordkeeping would be
the same.
For example, ICD-10-CM codes from category T40 (overdose) denote
the specific substance relating to the overdose, the intent of the overdose
(accidental, intentional self-harm, assault, and undetermined), and the type
of encounter (i.e., initial, subsequent, or sequela). 398 Category F11 denotes
use, abuse, or dependence, and captures associated complications
including, for example, delirium, mood disorder, sleep disorder,
withdrawal. 399 Other related conditions commonly associated with
opioids include acute respiratory failure 400, acute kidney failure 401,
coma 402, liver failure, and constipation. 403 Local governments also know
how much they pay for employees’ opioid medications covered by the
employee health plan. 404 They also could track when certain employees
are unable to work because of an opioid prescription, e.g., a sanitation
worker who cannot drive a garbage truck because he is taking opioids
following minor surgery. The costs associated with that lost productivity
Decatur County (July 23, 2018); Telephone Interview with Traci Mason, Benefits and Wellness
Administrator for Athens-Clarke County (Aug. 7, 2018).
397. Id.
398. Poisoning by, Adverse Effect of and Underdosing of Narcotics and Psychodysleptics
(Hallucinogens), AAPC CODER, https://coder.aapc.com/icd-10-codes/T40 [https://perma.cc/8FPVE6GC] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
399. ICD-10 Code for Opioid Related Disorders F11, AAPC CODER, https://coder.aapc.com/icd10-codes/F11 [https://perma.cc/VB75-ZGZB] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
400. Rajnish K. Gupta, MD & David A. Edwards, MD, PhD, Monitoring for Opioid-Induced
Respiratory Depression 32 J. ANESTHESIA PATIENT SAFETY FOUND. NEWSL. 70, 70 (Feb. 2018),
https://www.apsf.org/article/monitoring-for-opioid-induced-respiratory-depression/ [https://perma.
cc/H9JM-JSTG].
401. Mary Mallappallil et. al, What Do We Know About Opioids and the Kidney?, 18(1) INT. J.
MOL. SCI. 1, 4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5297852/
[https://perma.cc/PQW5-P5V8].
402. Will Dane et. al, The Solution to Opioids is Treatment, BRAIN INJ. ASS’N OF AM.,
https://www.biausa.org/public-affairs/media/the-solution-to-opioids-is-treatment [https://perma.cc/
JQK4-PV2A] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
403. Opioid Use Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Nov. 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/
patients-families/addiction/opioid-use-disorder/opioid-use-disorder [https://perma.cc/2875-DRJA]
(last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
404. Telephone Interview with Michelle West, Accounting Manager, Human Resources for
Decatur County (July 23, 2018); Telephone Interview with Traci Mason, Benefits and Wellness
Administrator for Athens-Clarke County (Aug. 7, 2018).
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would appear as sick leave.
In some instances, local government provide grants or subsidies to the
safety net hospitals that serve their communities. Our interviews
suggested that county indigent care grants are the exception, not the norm.
In Georgia, it is entirely within the discretion of counties whether to
provide indigent care funds to their safety net hospitals. 405 Atlanta’s
Grady Health Systems receives funds from Fulton and Dekalb counties in
metro Atlanta. Northeast Georgia Health System, which has the second
busiest emergency room in the state, 406 after Grady, is the safety net
provider for Hall county. It receives no local government funding from
any of the counties that it serves. Even when grants are extended, the city
or county does not directly cover the costs of medical service but only
subsidizes them; thus, determining the government’s opioid-related costs
requires additional steps. For example, suppose a government subsidizes
its local hospital for indigent care by giving the hospital $500,000
annually. The hospital first would need to sum all the costs related to
indigent care, and then isolate those indigent care patients that had opioidrelated costs. The percentage of opioid-related indigent care costs would
be multiplied to the subsidy of $500,000 to determine the county’s opioidrelated damages. A hypothetical calculation is below.
Fig. 2: Hypothetical Calculation of Hospital Indigent Care Costs
County indigent care grant: $500,000
Total hospital indigent care costs: $1.5 million
Indigent care costs related to opioids: $30,000
Percentage of indigent care costs related to opioids: 2%
_______________________________________
($500,000) (2%) = $10,000 (county costs for indigent opioid care)

Finally, any opioid-related grants or spending specifically allocated to
local drug treatment centers grants or other facilities should also be easy
405. See David Wickert, Fulton could cut spending on Grady by $25 million, ACJ (Nov. 19,
2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/fulton-could-cut-spending-grady-million/b6sxS2q5YioFW9Pg6X
m5aN/ [https://perma.cc/L8NM-FEE2].
406. Courtney O’Neal-Hill, Top of the List: Atlanta’s Largest Hospitals and Georgia’s Top
HMOs, Atlanta Business Chronicle (Oct. 28, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/
atlanta/news/2016/10/28/top-of-the-list-atlantas-largest-hospitals-and.html.
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to track. For example, the Hall County Treatment Center has grants
specifically for MAT, the amounts of which could be readily identified as
opioid-related spending. 407 Other Community Development Block Grants
(CBDG) 408 would be easy to quantify, if dedicated to opioids. If geared
toward drug treatment more generally, however, additional research would
have to be conducted to identify the portion of the grantee’s work was in
the service of those with opioid use disorders and addiction. To capture
these types of costs, we included local government finance department
representatives in our interviews because any city or county grants would
be managed there. 409
In sum, our qualitative interview results suggest that the “easy”
category is smaller than we anticipated, presenting clear challenges for
plaintiffs and their attorneys in demonstrating damages in the lawsuits, as
well as for local governments deciding on resources to allocate to the
opioid epidemic. With respect to the litigation, there seems to be very little
cost or other downsides for cities and counties to join the MDL. Plaintiffs’
attorneys front the costs, present ready-to-file complaints, and offer the
promise of “free” money to budget-strapped local governments. But as
the discovery and settlement process unfolds in Judge Polster’s MDL and
other courts, local governments may be struggling to respond to discovery
and other requests. Indeed, a group of cities suing in Connecticut recently
were dismissed on standing grounds for failing to demonstrate cognizable
injury. 410 Predictably, other local government plaintiffs will meet similar
challenges, on standing or other grounds, as these cases proceed.
2. Medium to Quantify
The “medium” category includes costs that take more effort to
quantify and those for which the ease of determining specific amounts may
407. Telephone Interview with Nancy Smallwood, Grants Manager, Joy Walker, Housing
Information Specialist, and Zachary T. Propes, Financial Services Director, Hall County Financial
Services (Aug. 24, 2018).
408. Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), GA. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFF.,
https://www.dca.ga.gov/community-economic-development/funding-programs/communitydevelopment-block-grants-cdbg [https://perma.cc/BE3U-L9TS] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
409. Telephone Interview with Nancy Smallwood, Grants Manager, Joy Walker, Housing
Information Specialist, and Zachary T. Propes, Financial Services Director, Hall County Financial
Services (Aug. 24, 2018).
410. See Cities Appeal Dismissal of Lawsuits Against Opioid Makers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan.
23, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/aae6b967e1a547e9b3f2dcccc534de42 [https://perma.cc/QLQ7G4Y2] (“Judge Thomas Moukawsher in Hartford ruled Jan. 8 the lawsuits are not allowed because
they were not filed as government enforcement actions authorized by state public interest laws. . . .
[concluding] opioid manufacturers cannot be held responsible to municipalities for indirect harms
from the opioid crisis.”); see also Schott, supra note 370.
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vary depending on a jurisdiction’s particular recordkeeping practices. Our
“medium” category includes jails, county attorneys (prosecutors and
public defenders) and courts, parks and recreation, and police (both drug
enforcement and code enforcement authorities). Some of the additional
effort would be retrospective, culling through records to identify historical
costs not otherwise captured. Some would be prospective, putting in place
tracking software or other systems, or creating feedback loops, such as the
suggestion above for hospital toxicology screens to be reported back to
EMS. One of our follow-on projects for this qualitative research is to
develop those sorts of systems and train local governments on their use,
work that is very much in keeping with the service and outreach mission
of the University of Georgia, and similarly situated land-grant
universities. 411
One example of “medium” costs that could be tracked with some
additional steps include jail costs. 412 The ability to track opioid-related
effort will be “easy” or “medium” depending on whether the sheriff tracks
why a person is incarcerated in a way that allows a retrospective search of
the data. Jails may or may not record the criminal code corresponding to
the arrest or otherwise update intake data following plea or conviction.
Even if data more specific than “DUI” or “possession” is recorded, it may
not be in an easily searchable database, requiring a time-intensive review
of records. City and county jail populations include a mix of pre-trial
detainees (the majority) and convicted inmates (serving sentences for
misdemeanors and sometimes serving shorter felony sentences not
transferred to a state facility).
If the jail does record reasons for incarceration, then a similar
calculation to the courts’ costs example above could be done. 413 The
average per-inmate cost (i.e., roughly $45/day/per inmate in AthensClarke County) 414 could be multiplied by the number of opioid-related
incarcerations. Absent those data, jails at least could determine prisoner

411. The Mission of the University of Georgia, UNIV. OF GA., https://www.uga.edu/mission.php
[https://perma.cc/TM4Q-NESZ] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
412. See generally About GDC, GA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/
AboutGDC/About [https://perma.cc/BH73-ZBSH] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019); see also CHRISTIAN
HENRICHSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF JAILS: MEASURING THE TAXPAYER COST
OF LOCAL INCARCERATION 4 (May 2015), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/
downloads/Publications/the-price-of-jails-measuring-the-taxpayer-cost-of-local-incarceration/
legacy_downloads/price-of-jails.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2RM-6S5A].
413. See supra Figure 1.
414. Telephone Interview with Tommy York, Athens-Clarke County Jail Commander (Aug. 10,
2018).
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medical costs related to opioids, including detoxification, MAT, 415 and
any other associated medical and mental health costs. Prisoners needing
those services are already identified and the drug and medical costs are
easily traceable. If the detox occurs on-site, medical staff time can be
calculated based on number of days in the infirmary. If the detox occurs
at the local hospital, according to our interviews, the county pays directly,
on a cost basis, for any services provided to prisoners, as described above
under the “easy” category. 416
Court administration, as discussed above, seems fairly easy to track as
those administrative costs are directly borne by local governments. The
question becomes harder for other legal departments, including public
defenders; 417 prosecutors (which may include district attorneys, who
handle felonies, or solicitors general, who handle misdemeanors in some
larger counties); 418 Superior Courts, 419 which include Accountability
Courts 420 and, as subsets, Drug Courts and Mental Health Courts; 421
Juvenile Courts; 422 other limited-jurisdiction courts, such as State Courts
in some counties 423 which hear misdemeanors, including DUI, and may
also have separate Drug/DUI tracks; 424 and Municipal Courts, 425 which
may hear code violations, shoplifting, marijuana possession, and other
low-level cases. Additionally, some counties may use Probate and
Magistrate Courts for certain misdemeanors, other minor crimes, and
preliminary matters and proceedings. 426 The county Clerk of Courts may
415. See generally Jailed-Based MAT: Promising Practices, Guidelines and Resources, NAT’L
COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.ncchc.org/jail-based-MAT
[https://perma.cc/L3QV-ZNZP].
416. Telephone Interview with Tommy York, Athens-Clarke County Jail Commander (Aug. 10,
2018).
417. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-23 (West 2014).
418. Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia, GA. GOV, https://georgia.gov/
agencies/prosecuting-attorneys-council-georgia [https://perma.cc/6STT-RGCK] (last visited Apr. 22,
2019). See also Telephone Interview with C.R. Chisholm, Athens-Clarke County Solicitor (July 31,
2018).
419. See generally GA. SUPER. CTS., https://georgiasuperiorcourts.org [https://perma.cc/6BG7NNU8] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
420. See generally GA. ACCOUNTABILITY CTS., https://www.gaaccountabilitycourts.org
[https://perma.cc/RQ9A-S8PR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) and COUNCIL OF JUV. CT. JUDGES OF GA.,
http://cjcj.georgiacourts.gov [https://perma.cc/LWY4-XW4N] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
421. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1-15 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).
422. Id. § 15-11-50 (West 2009); Id. § 15-11-28 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).
423. Id. § 15-7-4 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).
424. State Court, ATHENS-CLARKE CTY., https://www.athensclarkecounty.com/954/State-Court
[https://perma.cc/Y4AS-NAGH] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
425. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-32-1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013).
426. Georgia’s Court Structure, JUD. COUNCIL OF GA. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CTS.,
http://municipal.georgiacourts.gov/content/georgia%E2%80%99s-court-structure [https://perma.cc/
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oversee both the Superior Court and limited-jurisdiction courts. 427
For these various legal departments, opioid-related costs are hard to
track and attribute to local governments for various reasons. First, the
funding is a mix of state and city or county dollars. Funding for Superior
and Juvenile Courts in Georgia is a mix of state and county sources, while
the courts of limited jurisdictions are city or county-funded. 428 Public
defenders’ and district attorneys’ salaries primarily come from the state,
although counties may supplement them. 429 That said, the state public
defender system funds only one Superior Court public defender per county
and only a portion of Juvenile Court public defenders and defenders’
support staff. Caseloads typically require additional public defenders,
which are county-funded. For counties with Solicitors General, the county
pays their compensation. 430 Thus, the first task would be identifying
which cases were handled by which courts and attorneys, recognizing that
cases may move among various venues and personnel as charges are
added, dropped, or settled. That disaggregation task alone would be
daunting.
Second, even assuming some cases could be identified as countyfunded, those employees typically do not track costs related to particular
charges in the same manner as Court Administration, described above.
Thus, local governments would need to implement new systems to track
staff time for opioid-related cases. Historically, local government legal
departments have not needed to “bill” their time (in contrast to some
private attorneys). Accordingly, any attempt to capture data on opioidrelated cases specifically would require a cultural change. These
departments might retroactively compile those data by combing through
old case files, which may or may not be electronic or term-searchable. The
Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet described above calls for ten years of
historical data on court expenditures with respect to each category of
damages. 431 To create any historical dataset would require not only timeconsuming, tedious work but also assumptions about the amount of time
spent on cases, or creating average time estimates for types of cases (e.g.,
pleas versus trials, single versus multiple defendants, single versus
multiple charges, type of charge).
K5F4-E8VG] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
427. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-6-60 (West 2009); Id. § 15-6-61 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); Id. §
15-6-51.
428. See Georgia’s Court Structure, supra note 426.
429. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-25; Id. § 15-18-10 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013).
430. Id. § 15-18-67.
431. Fact Sheet Implementation Order, supra note 124.
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If a tracking system were implemented, then the total time in a fiscal
year dedicated to cases involving opioids would be divided by the total
time spent on all cases to create an opioid effort, similar to the Court
Administration calculation above. 432 All that being said, a number of cases
still might not be captured. For example, the charged offense may not be
drug-related, such as a non-violent theft offense, even though the offender
suffers from an addiction and may enter treatment programs through the
Drug Court. In sum, the calculation of local government judicial system
costs related to opioids, aside from Court Administration, would be
challenging.
Opioid-related costs for Parks and Recreation (sometimes called
Leisure Services) departments might include cleaning up drug
paraphernalia from homeless camps or other locations that opioid-users
frequent. The costs would include the city or county workers’ time and
any special equipment and training to safely collect and dispose of the
waste. If police accompaniment is needed for safety of the workers, those
costs would also be included. For the three counties we interviewed, this
had not become a significant issue, but reports from other parts of the
country reveal that the problem does exist and may even be prevalent
enough to warrant providing needle disposal containers in public places. 433
We include the costs in our “medium” category, for now, because the
problem is not yet prevalent at least in the three localities we interviewed.
Another potential cost for local government recreational facilities are
public campgrounds, such as in Hall County. 434 Enforcement issues might
include drug paraphernalia clean-up, as above, and other rules
enforcement, such as noise or other disturbances, overstaying time-limits,
and evictions. 435
In a few discrete instances, law enforcement efforts related to opioids
could be captured if additional tracking systems were implemented. In
Georgia, police are city departments and sheriffs are county departments.
The local government funding source is clear, although state and federal
enhancement is possible. 436 In some cases, local law enforcement officers
432. Supra Figure 1.
433. Kevin Miller, Portland Adds Needle Disposal Boxes in Some City Parks as Heroin Crisis
Continues, PRESS HERALD (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.pressherald.com/2015/09/22/portland-addsneedle-disposal-boxes-in-some-city-parks-as-heroin-crisis-continues/
[https://perma.cc/WS2LFXPW].
434. Telephone Interview with Mike Little, Hall County Parks & Leisure (Aug. 7, 2018).
435. Id.
436. There have been proposals to enhance police but not necessarily sheriffs and their deputies’
salaries with state dollars. Greg Bluestein, Panel Eyes $7 Million in State Funds to Boost Local Cop
Pay in Georgia, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-

1126

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 67

may participate in drug enforcement efforts such as multi-county drug task
forces. 437 Their work is typically planned and targeted to arrest drug
dealers and manufacturers, such as methamphetamine labs. 438 Whether
opioids are involved in an investigation may not be known until an arrest
is made and the drugs are collected. For example, the officers may build
a case of known cocaine dealer only to also seize heroin when an arrest is
made. But, again, law enforcement investigators do not track the hours
spent on each case. Therefore, even with investigations and arrests known
to be drug-related, law enforcement agencies would need to develop a
system to track time spent on each case, as well as additional costs like
travel. Still, they would need to segregate resources spent on
investigations involving opioids, which, in some cases, may require
retrospective data culling and analysis, similar to the approach for
identifying legal departments’ efforts and overhead related to opioids,
assuming the local government costs could be isolated.
Aside from those particular scenarios, law enforcement costs related
to opioids will be challenging to track because those services, along with
fire, emergency response, sanitation, public works, and other departments,
are provided as public goods, not on a benefit-received model. Public
goods are those in which one cannot isolate the benefits of a good,
resulting in the classic “free rider problem” and undersupply of these
goods in the private sector. 439 The classic example is fire protection which
benefits not just the person whose house is on fire but also neighbors’
homes when the fire is extinguished. Likewise, it is often impractical to
isolate beneficiaries of a service and make them pay for it. Can you
imagine having a toll road on every street corner? In essence, local
governments and the public do not expect local governments to charge for
services based on a specific cost or benefit received for their core services:
police, fire, street maintenance. Rather, the public’s expectation is that the
govt—politics/panel-eyes-million-state-funds-boost-local-cop-pay-georgia/F8pB3alhhKbib6BTkx4
C5K/ [https://perma.cc/2KQV-SG6K]; Craig Schneider, Sheriff’s Deputies: We Face Highest Risk But
Lowest Pay, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/sheriff-deputiesface-highest-risk-but-lowest-pay/9qCwAO7PcOMF61F7QyykFO/ [https://perma.cc/XA8Z-AW3L].
Also, some local police departments may receive grants, including federal funds. See Hilary Bitschek,
Ga. SWAT Team Gets Over $700K in Funding, MARIETTA DAILY J. (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.policegrantshelp.com/news/8311290-ga-swat-team-gets-over-700k-in-funding/
[https://perma.cc/QPQ7-MB44].
437. See, e.g., Regional Drug Enforcement Offices, GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://investigative-gbi.georgia.gov/regional-drug-enforcement-offices
[https://perma.cc/T74QFXAR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
438. Telephone Interview with Gary Epps, Christopher Nichols, & Benjamin Dickerson, AthensClarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 2018).
439. See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 7–8 (1984); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 25–35
(1998) (surveying dominant theories and literature on city services as public goods).
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city or county will provide those services at a level supported by the
majority of the community. Moreover, some users of a service—such as
a jail or court system—are not the beneficiaries. Rather, the public is by
having a safer community. In sum, local governments at their core exist
to provide services where costs and benefits cannot be traced to individuals
and, thus, have not developed specific user and cost tracking systems.
Although such systems might be designed to better capture opioid-related
costs, the implementation itself would require expertise and resources,
personnel, financial, and other.
3. Hard to Quantify
The third category of costs, those that are very hard to quantify, was
larger than we expected. This category includes not only indirect and
intangible costs but also seemingly straight-forward, identifiable costs,
including emergency communications (i.e., 911 calls), criminal
investigations, code enforcements, and city and county personnel costs.
We discuss the surprisingly hard direct costs first then briefly identify a
host of indirect and intangible costs.
911 is a county-level service in Georgia, although some funding may
come from the state, including a sales tax on prepaid phones. 440 Calls may
be coded as suspected overdose but not necessarily opioid-related. Unlike
law enforcement through a drug task force where investigative work is
planned and focused on narcotics, patrol work is reactionary. Officers 441
respond to 911 calls and initiate incidents based on observations, such as
pulling over a driver who is weaving across road lanes. After responding
to a call for service, officers write a narrative, regardless of whether an
incident report was made. 442 While these incidents could potentially
provide data on whether opioids were involved, most law enforcement
departments use a form of electronic report-writing to speed the process
for the officers. 443 These data systems have general categories of crimes,
440. See Mark Niesse, Georgia 911 Agencies Mysteriously Lose $5 Million in State Funding,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/georgia-911-agencies-mysteriously-lose-million-state-funding/Mb3NEkFyamAYJ0GuRq3
PzJ/ [https://perma.cc/Y3TB-C8TS] (reporting that $5 million in state funding for 911 from $.75 tax
on prepaid phones had seemingly disappeared).
441. This explanation applies to police officers and sheriff deputies. For this report, we use just
the term “officers” for consistency.
442. Telephone Interview with Gary Epps, Christopher Nichols, & Benjamin Dickerson, AthensClarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 2018).
443. Cindy Coleman, How Incident Reporting Impacts Officer Productivity and Safety,
POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/police-technology/
software/report-writing/articles/478769006-How-incident-reporting-impacts-officer-productivity-
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such as assault, robbery, and narcotics, that an officer checks to easily
classify the reason for the stop or arrest. Where narcotics are a factor in a
service call, an officer may include the types of drug or drugs found in the
report narrative but relatively few departments would have an easy way to
quickly search every report to determine if opioids were included.444
Other 911 calls may not even indicate suspected overdose, but simply that
a person is unresponsive or unconscious. Also, some 911 centers serve
multiple jurisdictions, requiring a tracking system to identify calls for
particular cities or counties.
For 911 calls involving police and crime, as stated earlier, arrests
involving opioids can be tracked through docket databases of the Clerk of
Court. 445 But applying only those cases to a calculation of law
enforcement effort with narcotics (a broader category, a subset of which
would be opioids) would understate the actual impact on the department
because many officer calls do not result in specific arrests for opioids.
Under Georgia’s safe harbor statute, a person calling 911 for assistance
with an overdose will not face criminal charges nor will the person who
has overdosed. 446 Therefore, an officer can assist with an overdose call,
including but not limited to administering naloxone, and neither the person
calling nor the person receiving treatment will be arrested. 447 In some
cases, including a video that went viral on social media, the person calling
may even be the addict’s dealer. 448
As discussed under the review of earlier opioid studies, opioids are
undoubtedly a driving force for property crime as addicts commit those
crimes to pay for their drugs. Because clearance rates for property crimes
are generally low (e.g., nationally, 19.2% in 2017 for larceny-theft), 449 law
enforcement at a local level often cannot say what percentage of property
crime was specifically associated with narcotics, much less opioids
and-safety/ [https://perma.cc/Q3JT-A6BW] (noting that over two-thirds of departments surveyed use
electronic police reporting software).
444. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Gary Epps, Christopher Nichols, & Benjamin
Dickerson, Athens-Clarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 2018).
445. Telephone Interview with Betty Logan, Athens-Clarke County Clerk of Courts (July 25,
2018).
446. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-5(b) (2014).
447. Id.
448. Katharine Q. Seelye, et al., How Do You Recover After Millions Have Watched You
Overdose?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/us/overdosesyoutube-opioids-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/M2H2-SGQC] (discussing viral videos of overdoses
across the United States).
449. 2017 Crime in the United States, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/clearance-browse-by/national-data
[https://perma.cc/9PLY-4KX5] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
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specifically. Similarly, housing code and other city- or county-ordinance
violations are hard to correlate with opioids as opposed to drugs more
generally or a host of other socioeconomic, medical, and other factors. As
one code enforcement officer explained, their officers may be called out
to a property or identify a property because of piles of garbage in the yard,
noise, or other disturbances. 450 They may investigate and issue a citation,
only to be called out to or notice the property in a similar condition some
weeks or months later. Alternatively, the violators may relocate within the
jurisdiction and have that property fall back into similar condition.
Investigations may on occasion reveal the presence of drug paraphernalia,
but they may not necessarily be opioid-related. Moreover, the code
enforcement officer may not have grounds for or exercise discretion in
involving drug enforcement authorities in the incident.
A host of other financial impacts on cities and counties will be very
difficult to quantify. As discussed above in the “easy” category, direct
medical costs for local government employees may be identified by
insurance billing records. 451 That said, the Human Resources department
may not know whether an employee is using prescription opioids
appropriately or is abusing them. If a local government employee is
abusing drugs, his productivity almost certainly would be lower, but
quantifying that cost to the city or county would be challenging.
Moreover, there could be lost productivity due to a family members’
addiction, even if the employee himself is clean. In theory, it might be
possible to correlate some workplace injuries with prescribed opioids if
the worker experiences reduced alertness, focus, or coordination due to the
drug. Perhaps the value of damaged equipment, worksite shut-downs, or
project delays could be identified. But, again, the process would be
laborious. In theory, a city or county Human Resources department could
establish a system to track employees prescribed opioids, even
appropriately following surgery or for chronic pain, and establish patient
education or other interventions. But, again, those would be costly to
implement and track.
Lost economic development and opportunities in opioid-impacted
communities is another probable effect of opioids that is difficult to
quantify. A community may become known for having a high rate of
opioid use disorder and thus be passed over by businesses looking to locate
new retail stores, manufacturing facilities, or corporate offices. The
company’s concerns may include suspicion that an insufficient number of
450.
2018).
451.

Telephone Interview with Dennis Bechtold, Hall County Code Enforcement (Aug. 22,
See supra Section IV.B.1.
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potential workers could pass a pre-employment drug screen, or that
employees, once hired, would be less productive and more expensive to
insure than in a different locality. As explained above, lost productivity
has been captured on various macro studies of the opioid problem. But
those results do not translate clearly to particular localities. The effect of
drugs on blight and depressed property values also would be difficult to
trace to opioids specifically, much less to quantify.
Lost opportunity costs also would be very difficult to quantify. These
opportunity costs relate to services that local government does not offer or
provides at a lower level because resources are shifted to address opioid
costs. Examples of opportunity costs include police officers having less
time to patrol, slower response times from EMS, foregone park
maintenance, and non-opioid mental health services.
Other intangible costs, including but not limited to loss of community
well-being and safety, both perceived or actual; decreased quality of life
and emotional well-being for opioid abusers and their families and social
support networks; emotional and economic impacts of overdose deaths on
families; and long-term impacts in terms of educational attainment, mental
health, employment, and economic self-sufficiency of children from
families affected by opioid abuse would all be very difficult to quantify. 452
In sum, in addition to certain direct costs—including 911, criminal
investigations, code enforcement, and Human Resources—that will be
harder to quantify than we anticipated, there is a seemingly indeterminate
list of indirect and intangible costs of the opioid epidemic that cannot be
attributed solely to the drug or easily quantified. Those impacts, however,
are real and substantial, warranting local government budget and planning
attention.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has provided a detailed description of the opioid litigation
brought by local governments, which was the genesis for our project. It
then surveyed existing studies on the financial impacts of the opioid crisis,
noting their shortcomings in terms of quantifying costs for local
governments, specifically. Finally, it described our study methodology
and findings, noting that local government opioid-related costs fall into
three categories, under our rather pedestrian taxonomy—easy, medium,
452. CORWIN N. RHYAN, ALTARUM, THE POTENTIAL SOCIETAL BENEFIT OF ELIMINATING
OPIOID OVERDOSES, DEATHS, AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS EXCEEDS $95 BILLION PER YEAR 3
(Nov.
16,
2017),
https://altarum.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-publication-files/ResearchBrief_Opioid-Epidemic-Economic-Burden.pdf [https://perma.cc/C45Y-CDFC] (listing various
indirect costs).
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and hard, in terms of the ability to quantify them. Our primary takeaway
points are: (1) assessing local government plaintiffs’ damages in the
lawsuits will be very challenging; (2) these challenges stem from the fact
that local governments are not set up to provide or track costs on a fee-forservice basis; (3) existing studies of opioid-related costs on localities
operate at the macro level and do not support assumptions about microlevel costs actually experienced by any particular city or county; and (4)
those studies do not even attempt to include very real indirect and
intangible costs, which may not be relevant to the lawsuits but are highly
relevant to city and county planning.
Given those points, we conclude by offering a few thoughts about the
implications of the current study and our plans for further research and
support for local governments in addressing the question of costs related
to the opioid epidemic. As noted, our project was designed to inform the
local governments plaintiffs’ damages claims as well as local
governments’ decision-making regarding policy choices and resource
allocation to address the opioid crisis in their communities. With respect
to the litigation, local government plaintiffs and the MDL and other courts
will need to more precisely identify truly local, as opposed to federal, state,
school, hospital authority, or private costs. A number of alleged damages,
especially medical costs, will fall only minimally or indirectly on cities
and counties. Even for the “easy” category of costs, local government
plaintiffs will need to expend resources to respond to the MDL discovery
for ten years worth of information. For the “medium” category of costs,
cities and counties may be able to capture some of those costs with
additional tracking systems, templates, feedback loops, or coding systems.
One of our future plans for this project would be to work with select
Georgia local governments—not necessarily the same ones interviewed
for this study—to pilot those sorts of instruments and training modules.
As noted above, local government recordkeeping and accounting is often
rudimentary, especially in rural communities hit especially hard by the
epidemic. Thus, any assistance would likely be welcome. Local
governments will have to weigh the costs of expending resources to better
track opioids costs against the benefits from a litigation settlement and
other funding and planning aims. For the “hard” category of cases, even
more resource-intensive tracking systems could be developed for the
direct costs, including 911, police effort, and Human Resources. For the
indirect and intangible costs, local governments may simply want to be
aware of those as they make budget and other resource allocation
decisions.
This study was limited in scope and largely anecdotal in responses
collected. For further research, we would like to expand and formalize the
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survey to additional local governments in Georgia, drilling down more
precisely on the available data in those communities. Additionally,
comparative research of cities and counties in other parts of the country
would be informative, especially given that many of the costs we
excluded—child welfare, public health, and medical treatment costs—
might fall more directly on local governments in other states. Other
potential costs that we identified, such as solid waste and economic
development, may have become apparent in other parts of the country.
Comparing local governments with similar demographics (e.g., rural or
urban, high opioid overdose rates, MAT or other evidence-based treatment
in jails or treatment centers) also would be instructive. By all accounts,
the direct, indirect, and intangible impact of the opioid epidemic continues
to accumulate across the country. This preliminary study, informed by
interviews with three Georgia cities and counties, provides a realistic
assessment of local governments’ ability to accurately and fully quantify
the toll the epidemic has taken on their communities.

